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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: A study on the effectiveness of the ISM Code through a
comparative analysis of ISM and PSC data
Degree:

MSc

This dissertation aims to examine the effectiveness of the ISM Code in the shipping
industry through a comparative analysis of ISM audit and PSC inspection data. This
paper focuses on the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code which, to an extent,
can be an indicator to measure the effectiveness of the Code. The assumption is
that if the ISM Code is working correctly, the ISM audit (PSC inspection) should
have a positive impact on the following PSC inspection (ISM audit). On that basis,
the paper analysed how the ISM audits and PSC inspections influenced each other,
and how this influence changes in two separate time frames.
The analysis revealed that the ISM audit showed a positive impact on overall
aspects of the safety management system; on the other hand, the effects of the
PSC have appeared in limited areas such as maintenance, and documentation
where the ISM audit showed vulnerability. It also found that the effect of the ISM
audit appeared after a longer period, while the impact of the PSC inspection was
exhibited in the short term period.
The result affirmed that the ISM Code has strengths in its continuous improvement
which requires a systematic approach, whereas PSC is robust in addressing
immediate

problems through

its

police function. The paper

identified a

complementary relationship between the ISM Code and PSC inspection. It showed
the possibility that the police power of the PSC can supplement the weakness of the
ISM Code in the short term, and at the same time, the continuous improvement of
the ISM Code can make the PSC inspection more effective.
This dissertation found that the ISM Code is partially working. In order to address
the improper functioning of the improvement mechanism relating to the PSC
deficiencies, it was proposed that more attention be given to whether corrective
actions were appropriately taken concerning previous PSC deficiencies.
KEYWORDS: ISM, PSC, Effectiveness, improvement mechanism, police power
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Since commercial shipping appeared in human history, the shipping industry has
been developing safety regulations under its own initiative to protect its property
from marine casualties (Anderson, 2003a). The classification societies, for instance,
were founded in the nineteenth century to ensure the seaworthiness of ships for
insurance purposes, which contributed to considerable technical advances in ships.
However, as seaborne trade grew and public concerns escalated due to constant
catastrophic marine casualties, the flag States gained the incentive to introduce
safety policies (Boisson, 1999).

By this means, various laws and rules of flag States formed traditions in shipping
whereby ships are obliged to comply with those safety rules. Simultaneously, flag
States took responsibility for ensuring the safety of the shipping fleets flying their
flags. This was written into international Conventions under the legal term
‘Genuine Link’1, requiring a flag State to exercise effective control and jurisdiction
over vessels flying its flag (Ö zcayir, 2001).

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), established based on the traditions
of flag State responsibility as a specialized agency of the United Nations and,
formed by the Member States, enacted the highest practicable international
standards for safety, security of ships and pollution prevention. Ever since the
establishment of the IMO, the organization has focused on technical issues to
1

The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, Art.91 of the UNCLOS 1982
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improve the safety level of ships, which was ineffective in addressing the underlying
factors causing marine accidents (Anderson, 2003a).

Research regarding a series of accidents2 in the second half of 1980s and 1990s
identified the human element as a major contributing factor to accidents, which
provoked a reassessment of IMO’s policies and incited a new systematic approach
toward maritime safety. In international efforts to eliminate human errors leading to
shipping casualties, spearheaded by the UK, the ISM Code was developed. The
ISM Code became mandatory through its incorporation in the SOLAS Convention
1974 as Chapter IX at the 2nd session of the SOLAS Conference on 24 May 1994.

The principle objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety and pollution
prevention concerning ship operations. The Code, unlike prescriptive regulations,
has not clearly stated specific technical requirements for ship structure, equipment,
and operational aspects. Instead, it sets goal based mandates, requiring shipping
companies to develop and implement their own safety management systems based
on their individual circumstances. This flexibility, designed to apply the ISM Code to
all types of ships, provides the shipping industry with room for further development
in terms of safety management but also demands a matured safety management by
the industry.

The ISM Code requires shipping companies to establish Safety Management
Systems (SMS) which allows verification of the implementation status of various
sets of international instruments. Shipping companies can maintain the compliance
with internationally endorsed rules by providing SMS, which should be regularly
verified by the flag State or Recognized Organization. The SMS ranges from
company policies on safety and pollution prevention to procedures for management
reviews, which implies that the management of shipping and shipboard work
procedures fall into the areas required to comply with international rules.

2

Herald of free enterprise (1987), Dona Paz (1987), Exxon Valdez (1989), Scandinavian Star (1990),
Agip Abruzzo (1991), Haven (1991), Salem Express (1991), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993),
Estonia (1994), Sea Empress (1996)
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In fact, regulating the operational procedure was not a completely new concept for
the shipping industry. Operational requirements, developed throughout history, have
been incorporated into various current rules. For instance, in the middle ages, the
large Mediterranean ports enacted stringent regulations to prevent overloading,
which passed down to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1876, known as the ‘Plimsol
Act,’ in the UK (Boisson, 1999)

Nevertheless, the value of the ISM Code should be distinguished from the existing
operational requirements because it expanded the areas to be regulated to shore
management and provided improvement mechanisms for the management system,
whereas specific operational requirements are merely focused on specific shipboard
activity and take a fragmentary approach. This made the ISM Code one of the most
comprehensive and effective tools for ensuring the implementation of flag State
obligations together with Port State Control (PSC).

Provided the flag State is a primary actor in the safety of shipping, port State might
be called a supporter. The first port State jurisdiction of control over foreign vessels
was presented in the SOLAS Convention in 1914, failing to come into force due to
World War I. The authority and legal capacity of the port State has been discussed
to establish the limits in protecting the interests of port States in various international
Conventions3. As the enforcement came into practice in many countries, the PSC
regime was widely accepted by the maritime industry as a ‘Safety Net’ to monitor the
safety of shipping and environmental protection (Ö zcayir, 2001).

The deficiencies identified by PSC inspections do not only imply the defective
condition of the ship. The results of the inspections directly present the safety
condition of the particular ship, and also the degree of implementation of flag State
obligations if they are extended to the whole fleet of the flag State. The rates of
detention are commonly utilized in the assessment of the safety level of the flag

3

SOLAS 74, reg. Ⅰ/19, reg. IX/6 and reg. XI/4; Load Line Convention 1966, Art.21; MARPOL 73/78,
Arts.5 and 6, reg.8A of Annex I, reg.15 of Annex II, reg.8 of Annex III and reg.8 of Annex V; STCW 78,
Art. X and reg. I/4; Tonnage Convention 1969, Art.12
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State by regional PSC MoUs 4 . And the results of PSC inspections have been
acknowledged by the way of explicit index as evaluating the performance of the ISM
Code since the deficiencies can be said to be the outcome of improper
implementation of the Code.

Along with the indicative functions for assessing the performance of the Code,
more importantly, PSC inspections substantially impact the safety management
systems of ships. If the SMS works properly, the deficiencies identified during PSC
inspections should be processed and thereby remedial action should be taken
according to the improvement mechanisms of the SMS. In this regard, Anderson
(1998) argued that the implementation of the ISM Code depends on how the SMS is
addressed and monitored by PSC inspection.

It might be possible to observe, in this respect, how the ISM Code works if we
measure the PSC performance after the ISM audit and, equally, evaluating the
performance of an ISM audit following PSC inspection would help us to determine
whether or not the ISM Code works. Besides, it would be possible to witness how
the good performers in ISM audits would perform at the following PSC inspection,
which would be practical information for the shipping industry to appreciate the
benefit of maintaining fair safety management systems in its companies.
1.2 Objectives

This dissertation started asking whether the ISM Code, and the PSC regime
positively impact the safety of ships as much previous literature investigated. Are the
audit and PSC inspections contributing to the safety of ship operations? If so, can
we demonstrate the same by comparing ISM audit records and PSC inspection
records to each other? This paper, based on this idea, will research the
effectiveness of the ISM Code by examining how the ISM audit impacts the PSC
inspection and vice versa. The study will focus on the data analysis of relations

4

Memorandum of Understanding

4

between performances in ISM audits and PSC inspections. Based on the analysis, it
will attempt to interpret the analysis results and seek further improvements to ensure
the effective implementation of both regimes.

It is hoped that the study will provide the shipping industry and Administrators with
better awareness of the ISM Code and PSC regime, and hopefully it would be taken
into account when maritime safety policies are established. Therefore, this
dissertation:



Reviews the pre-literature and methodologies related to examinations of the
efficiency of the ISM Code and Port State Control.



Studies the historical background, features and legal implications of the ISM
Code and Port State Control.



Analyzes the data of ISM audits and PSC inspection results for sampled
ships flying the Korean flag for a period of 2.5 years from the 2nd half of
2013 to 2015.



Tries to interpret the dataset and identify the statistical tendency from it.



Discusses the implication of the analysis and identifies areas to be
addressed for the further improvements.

1.3 Scope of the study

To achieve the objectives of the research, this dissertation consists of 7 Chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces the background, objectives and the scope of the study which
allows a better understanding of the purpose of the dissertation.

A literature review in connection with the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code
will be undertaken in Chapter 2 to appreciate which methodologies have been
applied to seek the results, and how the shipping industry and academia have
perceived the impact of the ISM Code. Equally, the paper will look into the literature
relating to the impact and benefit on the safety of shipping, legal jurisdiction,
targeting and harmonization, and influence of PSC on the shipping industry.

5

In Chapter 3, the background of the ISM Code as an international regulation will be
introduced. The legal implications and relations with flag State obligations and the
ISM Code will be studied through international Conventions and literature. In
addition, the way in which the ISM Code is implemented in Korea will be presented.
It will be concluded with that the main characteristics, the legal implications and
traits of the ISM Code to assist in understanding the analysis and discussion of the
data in Chapter 6.

In the way of the previous Chapter, Chapter 4 will review the background and the
emerging PSC MoUs around the world. The legal implication and current roles of
PSCs in relation to maritime safety and pollution prevention will be presented by
looking into the relevant Conventions and regional PSC agreements. Further, the
PSC practice in the Tokyo-MoU will be briefly addressed, and the implications of
PSC regimes on the maritime industry will be summarized.

Chapter 5 will describe the hypothesis of the dissertation and methodology. The
expected results, the analysis will be addressed in detail. The method of data
analysis including data sources, time frame, coding method, and data classification
principles applied will be explained.

As a core part of the writing, the data analysis results will be given in Chapter 6.
The outcomes of the study will show how the ISM Code impacts subsequent PSC
inspections with the passage of the time, and the same manner of analysis to
measure the impact of PSC inspections will be carried out. Furthermore, based on
the statistical analysis, the outcomes will be interpreted and discussed, by which,
the paper will demonstrate the hypothesis and identify potential areas for ensuring
the effective implementation of the ISM Code and PSC inspection.

Finally, Chapter 7 will recap and summarize the findings. It concludes with the
effectiveness of the ISM Code to the shipping industry and how the PSC regime
supports better implementation of the ISM Code and suggests areas for further
study.

6

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The International Safety Management Code

It would be significant work for administrators to evaluate the implementation
condition of a new policy, apart from appropriateness, after a certain period has
lapsed. In the maritime domain, for instance, if a new regulation for certain
equipment on board is adopted, it might be easy to verify it through the established
ship survey system. But, if the new policy is related to an intangible requirement, for
instance, the ISM Code, it would be challenging to verify its efficacy. It is virtually
impossible to verify overall compliance with the Code in a limited time, no matter
how well trained and experienced the auditor.

Some might say the relevant documents, such as Document of Compliance (DOC)
or Safety Management Certificate (SMC), indicate that the Code is working.
Nevertheless, they would not be sufficient to prove that the ISM Code had been
internalized and is working in the shipping companies and ships as intended. It is
not surprising that some argue that the SMC has become a mere license for ship
operations (Lloyds list, 2003). However, much of the literature confirms that the ISM
Code has, to some extent, had positive impacts on the shipping industry despite
associated problems, which hinder the effective implementation of the Code.

The literature regarding the ISM Code has focused primarily on the impact and
effectiveness of the Code on the shipping industry, along with the challenges
associated with its proper implementation. At the early stages of the first Phase of
the implementation of the ISM Code, researchers showed interest in the readiness
of the industry and attempted to identify the key elements to assist the shipping
7

industry in the implementation of the Code. Chauvel (1997) compared the ISM Code
and the quality management system; ISO 9002. Chauvel specified that the Code is
established “based on a structural and controlled approach similar to ISO 9000
standard relating to the quality control system”.

Anderson (1998) studied the potential impact on the shipping industry from a legal
perspective and practical aspects of the Code. The paper raised key issues related
to the ISM Code; the actors of the Code, limitation of liability, insurance implications,
and potential effects of the role of the designated person. Anderson concluded that
the success of the Code and impact on the company depends on how it is
developed and implemented in practice. Rodriguez & Hubbard (1999) also stressed
the legal implications of the introduction of the ISM Code, studying relations with
various regional laws and charter parties of insurance as a “New level of uniformity."
The authors claimed that the SMS would be significant evidence when an accident
occurs, for government investigators, underwriters, and courts, regarding how the
company had a positive approach as to safety as well as a useful management tool
for prudent ship owners.

After the introduction of the ISM Code, interest shifted to the impact of the new
Code. Many studies showed that the ISM Code has a positive impact, and has
contributed to the enhancement of the safety of ships and protection of the
environment. IMO (2005) confirmed that the ISM Code is heading in a positive
direction through a report5, submitted at the 81st session of the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC), the first work on evaluating the effectiveness of the Code in 2005.
The expert group, established by IMO, concluded that the “overwhelming majority of
responses were supportive of the ISM Code” and “the ISM Code is embraced as a
positive step toward efficiency through a safety culture, tangible positive benefits are
evident”.

5

Assessment of the impact and effectiveness of implementation of the ISM Code, MSC 81/17/1,
21 December 2005
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The positive impacts of the ISM Code were proved by way of financial benefits as
well. New Swedish club (2001) demonstrated the beneficial impacts of the ISM
Code through statistical data analysis of claims. The study found that the hull claims
showed a clear downward trend, which made the club conclude that the investment
in the ISM Code had been very worthwhile and effective implementation of ISM
Code has a beneficial influence on the company. The club also found that
respondents became more positive to the ISM Code as time lapsed (New Swedish
Club, 2001).
Anderson (2003a) described in the published research, “Cracking the Code”, that
the shipping industry also recognized the benefit of the Code since incidents
declined by virtue of the Code’s implementation in general. Anderson also surveyed
in his thesis that the majority of the Masters, ship operators, and other stake holders
agree that the number of incidents has decreased since phase one of the ISM Code
(Anderson, 2003b)

According to the MOMAF (2006), it was noted that Korean seafarers were also
aware of the function of the ISM Code in enhancing ship safety. One hundred and
nineteen seafarers responding to a survey gave a rating of 3.8 out of 5.0 points to
the question of whether the ISM Code contributes to safe ship operation.
Unexpectedly, the report underlined that the rating increased with the responder’s
maritime experience, contradicting the assumption that resistance to the ISM Code
comes primarily from mature seafarers. In contrast, relating to the role of the ISM
Code in the prevention of marine accidents, workers in the Korean shipping industry
held the view that its impact was minimal.

Research presented in 2010 revealed that 30.7% of 417 respondents agreed that
the Code contributed clearly to the decrease in accidents, but 47.2% agreed only
partly (MLTM, 2010). The report concluded that the ISM Code had not, so far,
exhibited clear effects on preventing accidents in the Republic of Korea even though
the majority of individuals in the industry recognized the positive impact of the Code.

9

The effectiveness and impact might be two sides of the same coin because the
positive impact would not appear if the ISM Code was not working effectively. In this
paper, in relation to the ISM Code, the impact is understood as the consequences of
the Code, while the effectiveness is understood as whether or not the Code is
working as it is designed to. The effectiveness of the Code has significant concerns
for academia as well. Most of the research recognizes that the Code is working to
some degree in practical ship operations, but there are still challenges facing the
achievement of its goals.

Anderson (2003) acknowledged that the Code was partly working and achieving its
objectives of the Code. The research revealed the interesting result that perceptions
relating to the ISM Code vary with the seafarers’ nationality. Anderson suggested
the necessity of taking cultural background into consideration when undertaking a
qualitative survey. The effectiveness of the Code was proved in the Finnish shipping
industry. Lappalainen et al. (2012) evaluated a Finnish shipping company to
determine the strengths and weaknesses of the policy instrument in the
implementation of the Code. The paper determined that the main objective of the
ISM Code had been achieved, which allowed the improvement of the safety level in
the Finnish company.

A Statistical approach has attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISM Code.
Mejia (2005) measured its effectiveness by contrasting the deficiency rate and
detention rate of ships on which ISM phase 1 and 2 have been applied and
exempted vessel, using the PSC data, collected from Swedish vessels, Swedish
Maritime Administration, and publications of regional PSC MoU. According to Mejia,
PSC inspection results of foreign ships in Swedish ports showed statistically
meaningful drops in the number of deficiencies per inspection, and Swedish vessels
with accelerated implementation of the ISM Code also exhibited significantly better
performances than others.

The study found that regional PSC Statistics also showed an overall positive effect.
The paper cautiously concluded that the ISM Code has positive potential for the
safety of ships while admitting the limitations of the PSC inspection regime and
10

restricted representativeness. The study validated the possible usefulness of using
PSC inspection Statistics in assessing the effectiveness of the ISM Code.

Kokotos (2012) conducted a study using a statistical approach through analyzing
investigation reports by the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) of accidents which
occurred in the restricted waters 6 over the period of 1995-2011. The research
identified significant reductions in the human errors, leading to accidents. The
results do not necessarily represent a cause and effect relationship between the
reduction in accidents attributed to human error and impacts of the ISM Code. But,
bearing in mind that one of the purposes of the ISM Code is to eliminate human
error in shipping, the study confirmed that the introduction of the ISM Code proved
to be effective for the enhancement of safety in the shipping industry.

Considerable research has contributed to the identification of challenges arising
during the implementation of the ISM Code. A number of studies claimed that too
much paperwork demotivated the seafarers’ involvement in the safety management
system. The typical off-the-shelf safety management system in the shipping
company does not help safety management and seafarers are complaining about
increased paperwork, including vetting inspection, and PSC (Nautical Institute,
2004). Such issues can cause seafarers to lose their primary purpose for working on
board (Anderson, 2003a).

According to IMO (2005), the Expert Group also recognized the burdens of
paperwork on board. The group recommended reducing administrative process and
using electronic technology to reduce the paper workload for further efficient
implementation. Lappalainen et al. (2012) also pointed out that bureaucracy was a
significant problem for the ISM Code and that it acted as a barrier to the flexible
development of the safety management practice of the company.

Hahne (2000) tried to find obstacles in the organizational aspect such as
organizational structure and safety policy, and qualification of the personnel. Hahne

6
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determined that the attitudes and perceptions of personnel involved are the most
crucial factor for the success of the ISM Code. The lack of safety culture such as noblame, in the shipping company, has constantly been pointed out. Seafarers are still
reluctant to report hazardous occurrences for fear of being blamed for the mistake,
which undermines the continuous improvement of the SMS (Lappalainen et al.,
2012; Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009; Sagen, 1999).

Anderson (2003) stressed the importance of motivating the individuals involved in
the implementation of the Code, which can arise only within the concept of the
culture. Anderson emphasized the significance of the safety culture by citing an
interview that “the success of the SMS depends on the dissemination level of the
safety culture on shipping company and the ship” (Anderson, 2003b).

Another key organizational factor affecting ineffective implementation of the Code
is poor support of personnel and resources by the company. Bhattacharya (2012)
found a significant disparity in the safety management level between two different
tanker organizations whereby there was a lack of seafarer participation in the safety
management of one company. The research concluded that the reason for the low
participation was caused by poor employment conditions, lack of organizational
supports and low-trust relationship with managers. The paper also affirmed the lack
of preconditions to achieve effective safety management in the shore-based
workplace.

Anderson (2003) also pointed out that insufficient company support relating to
resources, including physical, human resources, and training, causes unsatisfactory
implementation of the Code. Possibly, passive involvement in the SMS of seafarers
who belong to scrupulous companies are an expected response, but one which
ultimately has an adverse impact on the ISM Code.

The lack of interpretation has also been raised as one of the problems impeding
the successful implementation of the Code. Owing to the nature of the ISM Code,
the flexibility gives potential to the company to develop its customized skills.
However, this has brought about another issue. The researcher introduced the
12

testimony of a person involved, which stated that the auditors or Administrators had
different interpretations of the same defect due to lack of uniform interpretation and
the guidelines of the ISM Code. The shipping industry has suffered from confusion
due to vague interpretations of the requirements of the Code and it is resulting in
inconsistent implementation. Particularly, when auditing, the auditors tend to rely on
personal skills and experience. Some interviewees in the maritime industry
suggested that the Administration should develop its auditing practice. (Anderson,
2003; Lappalainen et al., 2012; Sagen, 1999).

Batalden & Sydnes (2014) tried to examine how the underlying causal factors in
marine accidents are allocated in the functional requirement of the ISM Code related
to human and organizational factors. They revealed the challenges of ineffective
implementation of the Code wherein the primary challenge lies in section 7 of the
ISM Code; “development of plans for shipboard operations.” The poor management
of the ‘resources and personnel’ (section 6), ‘master’s responsibility and authority’
(section 5), and ‘company verification, review and evaluation’ (section 12) were also
noted as significant shortcomings in the implementation of the ISM Code.

According to the previous literature regarding the ISM Code, in summary, it was
learned that the ISM Code has settled down in the shipping industry, and is showing
positive impacts therein as evidenced by the perceptions of personnel involved, and
reductions of marine accidents. However, the studies measuring the effectiveness of
the Code seemingly need to be more empirical to convince the shipping industry
that the ISM Code is beneficial to them in a practical way, and to make shipping
companies aware of obstacles to its proper implementation. Such studies could
provide the shipping industry with practical assistance to overcome these problems.
2.2 Port State Control
PSC has been performing as a “safety net of last resort” for the shipping industry
against improper exercise of flag State responsibility since it was established
(Ö zcayir, 2008). There is considerable literature regarding the impact and the
effective exercise of PSC inspection. Since the existing PSC literature uses the
13

terms impact together with effectiveness in a general sense, the terms will not be
distinguished in this section. PSC inspection has some inherent penalizing functions
for substandard ships, so the impacts of PSC inspections can be found in many
aspects.

If we look at the direct impact of the PSC, it might be a decrease in substandard
ships and marine accidents or vessel-source pollution. Hare (1997) studied the
overall PSC procedures, practice and domestic arrangement of several countries.
Although there were no explicit changes in the number of fatalities of seafarers and
total losses of vessels at that time, Hare concluded that PSC would be the most
effective measure in removing substandard ships and unscrupulous ship owners
from the industry based on efforts being undertaken by various entities.

However, Anderson (2002) applied a long term perspective, and proved 35 percent
cuts in the number of total losses since the 1970s, using the data taken from Lloyd’s
Register of Shipping, as evidence of positive impact of the PSC. It was assessed
that the rate of total loss of merchant ships has been declining by four percent every
year since PSC was introduced.

Cariou et al. (2008) conducted an investigation into the effect of an PSC inspection
on the following inspection in the number of deficiencies. The study found that the
percentage of vessels that had fewer deficiencies than in the previous inspection
was 63% for all age categories. The authors concluded that this demonstrated the
strong impact of PSC inspection on the safety condition of particular vessels.

The same research was conducted again using PSC data in the Indian Ocean MoU.
The analysis demonstrated that more than 60% of the vessels had fewer
deficiencies in the following inspections (Mejia, Cariou, & Wolff, 2010). The study
suggested that PSC inspection resulted in positive effects on successive PSC
inspections, although to different extent, depending on the age of the vessels.

Regarding the preventive effect on pollution, Bang (2008) carried out research on
the impact of PSC on vessel-source pollution using data from regional PSC MoUs
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and the USCG. Bang found that regarding breaches under MARPOL 73/78, there
was 60% reduction of oil pollutions during the 1980s in the US, and some
deficiencies related to MARPOL Annex I, and Annex II have declined in the Paris
MoU. The paper also showed that detention and deficiency rates were decreasing in
the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU.

The paper concluded that it was too early to assess the practical effects; however,
it could be a positive signal that the substandard ships are being controlled
appropriately by the PSC in general. In other words, the PSC regime has achieved
its purpose, by virtue of rigorous inspections, of preventing vessel-source pollution,
particularly from substandard vessels.

Knapp et al. (2011) carried out research to measure the monetary profits of PSC.
The study suggested that estimated cost savings on average, calculated based on
the total insured value, was in the range of USD 74,000 to 192,800 due to risk
reduction of total loss. It was also found that the cost savings went up as the vessels
aged except for passenger vessels, and the vessels in the group of undefined flags
and unknown classification society benefit from higher cost savings. Bearing in mind
that maintaining safety requires investment, it can be said that the shipping industry
benefits from port States taking certain parts of the costs.

The impact of PSC does not remain in safety itself, but changes the business
ecosystem as well. The PSC regime has been intensifying every year worldwide,
driving unscrupulous ship owners to change their ships’ flag and classification
society. It was confirmed that PSC inspection does not remain in monitoring the
safety performance of vessels, but influences the probability of flag-out and transfer
of classification society (Cariou & Wolff, 2011).

As the targeting system is enforced, vessels with poor performing flag State
nationalities and classification societies are likely to undergo repetitive and
intensified inspections in a shorter period, which causes flag-hopping and classhopping to avoid severe PSC inspections. Fan et al. (2014) found based on the
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data7 that the inspection rate of the ship was the most dominant determinant to
increase the probability of flag-out, while the size of the ship was a less significant
factor. With regard to the classification society, vessels registered to members of the
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) changed flags less
frequently than those registered in non-IACS member classification societies.

In connection with the effective exercise of the PSC, research has been
undertaken in various aspects. Bang (2008, 2013), mainly focused on anti-pollution
aspects, and recommended the proliferation of regional cooperative initiatives for
the exercise of port State Jurisdiction. It was also stressed that the port State should
be able to receive reliable information in case of vessel-source pollution. In addition,
suspension of certification of seafarers committing willful discharge of pollutants,
uniform statistical data management by the various PSC MoUs and several
targeting methods were suggested. For example, the PSC should target ships which
are not using port reception facilities. Fan et al. (2014) suggested considering other
possible measures such as monetary penalties for deficiencies, insisting that current
detentions or deficiencies are not enough to achieve effective enforcement.

Concerning the targeting methodology, it has become one of the most interesting
areas for Regional PSC MoUs how to effectively allocate the enforcement resources
in targeting substandard ships from a cost and benefit point of view. The regional
PSC MoUs have developed their targeting system to prioritize the vessels to be
inspected, and academia has contributed in line with targeting issues by providing
various studies.

Degré (2007) carried out research to identify high-risk vessels on the basis of the
concept of risk. The study took the probability of casualties and subsequent
consequences into consideration, as a part of the work of the European project

7

Data from Lloyd's Register, Port State Control inspection data from various Regional PSC MoUs,
Annual Report from Economic Freedom of the World, BMCO’s Shipping Industry Flag State
Performance, World Casualty Statistics from Lloyd’s Fairplay, and existing literature

16

MarNIS 8 of the 6th Framework Program. The research suggested that the ship
variables (type, size, age) be combined with the Paris MoU list of criteria in order to
improve the efficacy of the targeting system. The following year, the author
proposed a change to the targeting system, based on the worldwide casualty
database platform, to an individual vessel based targeting system by using a
multivariate approach taking into account the casualty records during a specified
period (Degré, 2008).

Cariou et al. (2007) attempted to determine which relevant factors should be
considered in targeting vessels. The paper found three main determining factors,
which are the age of vessel at inspection, the type of vessel, and the flag of registry.
The study revealed that the relationship between age of vessel and number of
deficiencies varied by the type of vessel. Cariou et al. (2009) attempted to ascertain
how to weigh the factors in selecting the vessels to be targeted. The research
showed that the age of vessel was the primary contributory factor in its detention,
followed by RO and place of the inspection. They also underlined that the weight of
the individual factors is variable depending on the type of deficiencies, and the
detention rate is also considerably affected by the inspecting authority, which calls
for the necessity of harmonized inspection regimes in the regional PSC MoU.

As far as harmonized PSC inspection is concerned, a series of studies was carried
out to look into the different probabilities of detention and different treatment of
vessels across regional PSC MoUs (Knapp & Franses, 2006, 2008; Knapp & van de
Velden, 2009). The studies pointed out that a ship subjected to too many repetitive
inspections in a relatively short period would lose the benefit of inspection. It also
turned out that the probability of the detention was affected by different levels of
enforcement from one place to another, and also the personal background of
inspectors, as demonstrated recently (Ravira & Piniella, 2016).

On the other hand, the profile of vessels, such as size, flag, classification society or
ship owner, was not necessarily significant. The researchers found that different
8
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areas of interest in terms of inspection by the inspection regime exist. The finding
indicates further room for improvement in the harmonization of the practical
inspection procedure. It was proposed to facilitate the harmonization at two levels;
IMO and regional level, which can be enhanced by uniform procedures, technical
assistance using GISIS9, and unified deficiency coding system.

To be brief, the PSC regime has been contributing not only to the enhancement of
the safety of the ship and prevention of maritime pollution but also to a sustainable
shipping business. To ensure the effective exercise of the PSC regime, refined
targeting methods and harmonized inspection procedures have been suggested.
However, more attention should be paid to finding the way to create more synergy
between the PSC regime and other influential maritime safety initiatives such as the
ISM Code.

9
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3. INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE

3.1 The Herald of Free Enterprise

Major international Conventions have developed in the wake of historical marine
accidents, for instance, the sinking of the Titanic gave birth to the SOLAS
Convention. Likewise remarkable disaster that triggered international conversation
on the management issue was the Herald of Free Enterprise. The Herald of Free
Enterprise, a 7,951 G/T, Roll on/Roll off passenger and freight ferry built in 1980,
registered at Dover, classed by Lloyd’s Register of shipping, engaged in the route
between Dover and Zeebrugge, capsized on 6 March 1987, resulting in the loss of
life of 193 passengers and crew.

The investigation report of the UK discovered that the Herald of Free Enterprise
surprisingly sailed out with its bow door open, which allowed the quick ingress of
water into the car deck, ending in rapid capsize. The faults causing the accident
seemed to be errors of individuals who should have taken responsibility on board;
however, the investigation report, more importantly, stressed the underlying faults
contributing to the chain of errors from the shore-based management.

To be precise, the investigators witnessed the collapse of the safety management
system across the company. They concluded that the unreasonable errors on board
which led to the disaster were consequences of the poor management of the
company stating that “From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the
disease of sloppiness” (Department of Transport, 1987). As an aftermath of the
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tragic incident, IMO Resolution A. 596(15) 10 which directed the IMO to move
forward to establish the shipboard and shore based management procedure, which
later became the ISM Code, was accepted on 19 November 1987 by member
States (IMO, 1987). Without a doubt, the Herald of Free Enterprise, in this regard,
was obviously a turning point in maritime safety regulations (Schröder-Hinrichs et al.,
2013).

3.2 New safety management approach of IMO instruments

The IMO has progressed, since 1959, from an international forum to discuss
maritime regulations related to technical standards. Article 1(a) of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO, the former organization of
IMO) was "to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments”……
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds…….” It evidently
shows the innate characteristic of IMO as a technical body (IMO, n.d.). It must be,
indeed, a reasonable approach considering the technologies relating to hardware of
vessels that had rapidly developed at that time, providing considerable room to
explore technical aspects.

In response to major marine casualties, IMO has developed new regulations and
guidelines mostly leaning towards technical issues as shown in Table 1. It illustrates
that the IMO’s response heavily relied on technical matters except for the STCW
Convention (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). Despite the efforts of the IMO to
prevent marine casualty, major incidents exploded during the 1980s and early 1990s,
which gave alert to international society and made Administrators ask themselves
what went wrong.
For instance, ‘The Human Element in Shipping Casualties’ in 1988, commissioned
by UK Department of Transport, and ‘Analysis of Major Claims’ in 1991 issued by
Thomas Miller P&I, suggested the clear message to the industry that marine
casualties occur primarily due to human errors (Anderson, 2003a). The messages
10

Safety of passenger Ro-Ro ferries
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enabled IMO heed the human element issues, resulted in the paradigm shift of
maritime administration policy at the international level, which is still ongoing (Mejia,
2005). As one of the solutions to tackle the problems in conjunction with human
error, the ISM Code was developed based on a holistic approach, providing a
framework for safety management of shore and ship operations.

Table 1 Selected accidents and the reactive follow-up in IMO
Year

Ship name

Resulting measure/instrument

In force
Since

1967

Torrey Canyon

Intervention Convention, 1969
Civil Liability Convention, 1969
MARPOL Convention, 1973
STCW Convention, 1978

1975
1975
1983
1984

1976

Argo Merchant

MARPOL Convention, Protocol of 1978

1983

1987

Herald of Free
Enterprise

ISM Code, 1994

1998

1989

Exxon Valdez

OPRC Convention, 1990
MARPOL Convention, 1998 amendments

1995
1995

1994

Estonia

SAR Convention, 1998 amendments

2000

1999
2002

Erika
Prestige

Res. 949(23) Guidelines on places of
refuge for ship in need of assistance

2003

Note. From "Maritime human factors and IMO policy" by Schröder-Hinrichs et al.,
2013, Maritime Policy & Management, 40(3), p. 246.

3.3 Flag State responsibility and the ISM Code
According to the Geneva Convention on the High Sea 195811, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS)12, a “Genuine Link” between flag State

11

Article 5
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose
flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in
particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical
and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that
effect
12
Article 91 Nationality of ships
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and ship should exist. Herewith, the flag State should be in a position “to exercise
effectively it jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters
over the ships flying its flag”, which is a responsibility conferred on the flag State by
Article 9413 of the UNCLOS (UN, 1982).

Article 94 of the UNCLOS imposes on the flag State responsibility for the safety at
sea of ships flying its flag, based on the principle of “Genuine Link”. Inter alia,
construction, maintenance and seaworthiness; manning, labor conditions and
competence of crew; and prevention of collision and provided legal obligations to
cope with national law and international treaties (Ö zcayir, 2001).

The duties of the flag State given by Article 94 of UNCLOS have been manifested
through various Conventions, codes, and guidelines developed by the IMO.
Although the ISM Code does not require specific technical or operating regulations
for the safety of the ship, it provides tools to monitor the implementation conditions
of safety and anti-pollution activities on shore and aboard in general. The ISM Code
requires in the objectives that the safety management system should encompass
compliances with the rules and regulations, codes, guidelines, and standards
recommended by internationally accepted organizations14 (IMO, 1993).

Namely, the ISM Code has an umbrella function in the discharging of obligations of
the flag State imposed by internationally accepted regulations. In addition, the ISM
Code provides a mechanism to ensure compliances with the code by the audit and
certification procedures in part B; Certification and Verification. Consequently, it can
be said that the effective implementation of the ISM Code is crucial not only to the

1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose
flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that
effect.
13
Article 94 Duties of the flag State
14
“1.2.3 The safety-management system should ensure:
.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and
.2 that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization,
Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into
account.”
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performance of the single Code itself but also to fulfilling flag State’s responsibility to
ensure the safety of ships and protection of the marine environment.
3.4 Traits of the ISM Code

The ISM Code consists of part A and part B, and associated guidelines for proper
implementation of the Code15 that was clarified by IMO Res. MSC. 353 (92)16. Part
A mainly institutes implementation requirements for company and vessel, which is
the main concern of this dissertation, while part B provides States with the
administrative procedures to verify and issue certificates in harmonized practice.
The primary trait of the Code is company’s responsibility. The terms ‘company’ is
the most repeated word throughout the text of the Code, an evidence highlighting
the role of the company above all else. The preamble to the Code says that ‘the
cornerstone of good safety management is the commitment from the top’, which
announces that the commitment related to safety and environmental protection from
the highest level of the company, reflected in section 2, has become a prerequisite
in the international shipping business (IMO, 1993).

The Code also stresses the safety management objective of the company in 1.2.2
and identifies the authority and responsibility of key players of the Code; company,
designated person, and Master in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6. Addressing and clarifying
the roles of the key players, focusing primarily on the roles of the shore, can be
fundamental and innovative measures in tackling the hazardous operations of the
ship.

15

Guidelines for the operational implementation of the International Safety Management Code by

Companies (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8), Guidance on the qualifications, training and experience
necessary for undertaking the role of the designated person under the provisions of the International
Safety Management Code (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.6), Guidance on near-miss reporting (MSCMEPC.7/Circ.7), Guidelines for the operational implementation of the International Safety
Management Code by Companies (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8).
16
Amendments to the International Management Code for the Safe operation of Ships and for
Pollution (International Safety Management (ISM) Code), Adopted on 21 June 2013
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No one can deny that the shipping industry has been affected by those
requirements concerning the cultivation of a safety culture, even if it is not the case
in reality to some extent (Heijari & Tapaninen, 2010). Taking into account the lesson
learned from ‘the disease of sloppiness’ and the commercial pressures today that
possibly cause poor company support and occurrence of accidents, the company’s
responsibility is one of the critical elements supporting the proper work of the ISM
Code (Withington, n.d.).

Secondly, flexibility should be another trait of the ISM Code. The preamble to the
Code explains the virtue of flexibility by recognizing the different conditions in which
companies exist. And the drafters of the Code tried to express this in broad terms by
the general principles and objectives (IMO, 1993). In exchange for providing
flexibility, the Code required the company to establish and implement the Safety
Management System (SMS) including essential functional requirements as set out in
1.4 of the Code. Different from other conventional regulations, this flexibility enables
the company to keep its optimum operation procedures and room to develop beyond
the regulations required by the Conventions.

The continuous training and customized work procedures for shipboard operations
with check lists might be one of the most effective measures to address human error,
which is caused by improper design, poor management on board or the ship
management practice, resulting in major causes of the marine accidents (Etman &
Halawa, 2007; Rodriguez & Hubbard, 1999; Rothblum et al., 2002; Squire, n.d.;
Townsend, Mariner, & Tatman, 2006). In this regard, the functional requirements
enabling customized SMS, supported by the flexibility concept, are one of the
valuable elements in achieving the goal of the ISM Code.

Thirdly, the improvement mechanism may be the most important function of the
ISM Code in terms of maintaining the practical and robust system, which is achieved
by the Master’s review, reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and
hazardous occurrence, and company’s verification set out in the 5.1.5, 9, and 12 of
part A. The mechanism maintains the system in a dynamic condition in compliance
with the ISM Code and free from deviations during the implementation of the SMS.
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Certainly, the improvement mechanism ensures the company maintains its optimum
SMS and prevents recurrence of unsafe operations in its vessels.

In spite of the advantages of the mechanism, the improvement mechanism is still
considered to be the utmost challenging area due to the ‘fear of blame culture’, and
lack of understanding as to the philosophy of the Code (P. Anderson, 2003a; Berg,
2013; Bhattacharya, 2009; Jouni Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009). The industry
seemingly lost the benefit of learning opportunities instead of repeating mishaps.
Furthermore, the mechanism could be an actual effective barometer of how the ISM
Code works appropriately and how the ISM Code has a positive impact on the
industry, which will be discussed in this dissertation in Chapter 6. Therefore,
continuous improvement is the key component to providing the company with a selfassessment and evolvement process.

3.5 The ISM Code in the Republic of Korea

The Maritime Administration of Korea, Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs,
promulgated “the directive on the implementation of the ISM Code” in May 1997
following IMO Res. A. 741(18). The directive was enforced without penalties for
those violated the regulations until the “Sea traffic safety Act” was revised,
incorporating the directives in February 1999. The enforcement of the ISM Code, by
type of vessels, followed the same timetable as SOLAS, which was accomplished 1
July 2002.

Peculiarly, the Maritime Administration decided to apply the ISM Code to domestic
service vessels in 2002. The vessels carrying dangerous cargo on and above 500
G/T were required to comply with regulations set out in the Act, which were
simplified version of the ISM Code taking into account the domestic shipping
environment. The domestic vessels subject to the simplified safety management
system extended gradually in size and type of vessel. In 2003, it was applied to
general cargo ships on and above 500 G/T, and it was completed by vessels
carrying dangerous cargo above 100 G/T in July 2012. But domestic passenger

25

vessels were excluded from it because they had been developing a similar safety
management system since the 1970s.

Coming back to the ISM Code, the Maritime Administration has delegated the
authority of verification and certification to a classification society, exclusively to the
Korean Register of Shipping, based on the Memorandum of Understanding on the
delegation of statutory survey and certifications. But audits and certifications for
domestic shipping are done by government inspectors in local offices, which keep
auditing skills in the house of the Administration.

The classification society should abide by the legal criteria to perform the statutory
functions, such as number of service network, qualification and experience of the
auditor, relevant directives for the audit and certification. Furthermore, the
Administration undertakes the oversight programs on the status of statutory
activities of the RO such as periodical reports of the performance in various aspects,
annual audit, and special audit on RO when the Administration believes it to be
needed.

The Administration may carry out a special audit on a ship and its company when
the Administration judges that it is required. By special audit, an auditor from the
Administration may withdraw the relevant certificate or request corrective actions as
a practice of the regular audit procedures. The cases that apply to the special audit
are as follows;



Upon the supervision over vessels detained by the PSC inspection, if the
Administration judges that it is needed to ensure the ship’s safety or to
prevent detention by PSC inspection in a foreign port.



Upon the supervision over vessels in order to check the implementation of
safety management, if the Administration judges that it is needed to ensure
safety and prevention of accident.



Upon a marine accident, if the Administration judges that it is needed to
ensure the safety and prevention of further accident.
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3.6 Implications and roles of the ISM Code

As it was reviewed in this Chapter, the ISM Code provides the company with the
framework of safety and environmental protection. It ensures the facilitation of
efficient monitoring of compliance with international rules that the vessel is subjected
to. The flag State also benefits in the enforcement of its obligations since the
Administrator can overview the performance of the fleet flying its flag through the
audit and certification process.

Seafarers also benefit from it even though some criticisms exist relating to
bureaucracy and workload (Bhattacharya, 2009; Lappalainen et al., 2012; Nautical
Institute, 2004). For instance, clear definition of responsibility between shore and
ship has brought responsible management practice and changed the culture so that
seafarers can report poor support from the company. There are some concerns that
seafarers may lose maritime knowledge, expertise, and skills because of too much
dependence on the SMS, but it is also true that uniform work procedures are helpful
in reducing human errors.

Owing to the enhanced safety of shipping, the insurance industry enjoys a
decrease in marine accidents as well (New Swedish Club, 2001). However, if the
company and seafarers do not exercise due diligent implementation of the Code,
they take legal risks such as breaching the terms of insurance coverage and losing
the right to limit financial liability when a marine accident occurs (Anderson, 1998).
Consequently, it can be said that the ISM Code contributes to safer and cleaner
shipping, simultaneously; legal responsibility will be imposed on unscrupulous ship
owners.
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4. PORT STATE CONTROL

4.1 The Amoco Cadiz
On the morning of March 16, 1978, the crude oil tanker, Amoco Cadiz17, Liberian
registered, owned by Amoco, carrying 1,604,500 barrels of crude oil from the Middle
East, experienced a failure in its steering gear system. The crew discovered that the
steering gear went wrong due to hydraulic oil leakage from broken bolts connecting
oil pipes, and tried to repair it, but it was soon found to be beyond their capability.
The Master of the Amoco Cadiz called the salvage tugboat, “PACIFIC”, but the
negotiation between the Amoco Cadiz and Salvage Company to reach an
agreement took some time, which made the ship drifting closer to the coastline by
fierce winds and rough sea. In the end, the tug boat had not enough capacity to tow
the tanker in severe weather conditions, resulting in the Amoco Cadiz grounding as
the tug struggled. (Bauer et al., 1992; Spooner, 1978)

The aftermath of the grounding was catastrophic. The ship tore into two parts and
its entire cargo oil and 4,000 tons of bunker fuel spilled into the sea. An oil slick 18
miles wide, 80 miles long affected around 200 miles of the Brittany coastline of
France. Beaches and 76 Breton communities were polluted. The oil spill resulted in
the tremendous loss of marine life and destroyed the ecosystem to a great scale. It
was reported that 20,000 diving birds died, and 9,000 tons of oysters were
devastated (Bauer et al., 1992; ITOPF, n.d.). Since the Amoco Cadiz oil pollution

17

233,690 DWT, 334.02LX51.06B X19.8D, built in 1975, 44 crew members, 1 X 30,400 HP Diesel
engine, Single screw
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occurred one month after the adoption of the 78 protocol of the MARPOL
Convention, the international society was even more traumatized by the accident.

The Amoco Cadiz drove IMO to elaborate the salvage rule, which later on
developed into London Salvage Convention of 1989 18 and enforcement of Port
State Control regime, which became IMO resolution A.466 (12)19 in 1981. Besides,
the Amoco Cadiz became a driving force for West European countries to extend the
‘Hague Memorandum’ in 1978, which was mainly concerned with living and working
conditions required by the International Labor Organization Convention no. 14720, to
include safety and environmental protection regulations of shipping. This issue was
discussed at the Regional European Conference on Maritime Safety in 1980, and
two years later, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding21 was signed by fourteen
countries in Paris, which had suffered enormously from the Amoco Cadiz disaster
(Hare, 1997; Paris MoU, n.d.-a)

4.2 Emerging of PSC MoUs
Port State Control was not created in one day by the Paris MoU. Various types of
controls existed throughout shipping history in European ports because the port
States have recognized the need to control substandard ships for a long time. This
belief was reflected in various international maritime Conventions so there were not
barriers in the exercise of PSC at that time. Although some countries in Europe had
port State inspections in their ports through their domestic laws, willingness to join
international cooperation for harmonized control over substandard ships was not yet
mature (Ö zcayir, 2008).

The Amoco Cadiz changed that way of thinking. Members of the initial Paris MoU
were convinced that they could be the next victims, and face political pressures after
a similar disaster to what France had suffered. Nowadays, the Paris MoU consists of
18

entered into force 14 July 1996
Procedures for the Control of the Ships, IMO A. Res. 466 (12), adopted 19 November 1981
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ILO Convention (No. 147) concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships, (Geneva, 29 October
1976)
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The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 1982 (Paris MOU)
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27 maritime Administrations, and undertakes more than 18,000 inspections with a
mission that is “to eliminate the operation of sub-standard ships through a
harmonized system of Port State Control” (Paris MoU, n.d.-b). The Paris MoU still
exerts the strongest influence on the PSC inspection regime and international
maritime industry. So, the awareness of the necessity of stringent control over
foreign ships had developed a proliferation of regional agreements on PSC as well
as IMO rules for ensuring uniform conduct of PSC inspections.

Following the pioneering Paris MoU, with the same aims, many regional PSC
MoUs developed during the 1990s and early 2000s. The Latin American Agreement
on Port State Control of vessels22 was adopted in 1992. The countries in the region
of Asia-Pacific gathered in Tokyo and came to an agreement23 in 1993. Notably, the
USCG joined as an observer and Chile, a member of de Viña del Mar, is also a
member of the Tokyo MoU. In 1996, the Caribbean countries signed an agreement24
in Barbados on February 9. The Mediterranean region25 also launched an MoU in
1997, and the Indian Ocean region26 in 1998. The Abuja MoU27 was signed for the
West and Central Africa region in 1999, Black Sea region28 in 2000 and the MoU in
the Gulf region29 was signed in 2004. As a result, ten regional MoUs including the
USCG around the world are organized and working for the elimination of
substandard ships as a “safety net”.

The regional MoUs on PSC commonly contain, inter alia;

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29



Structure (Organization) of the MoU.



Relevant international instruments.



Port State Control procedures; inspection, reporting, detention, etc.



Appeal process.



Amendment to the MoU.

The Acuerdo de Viña del Mar agreement on port state control 1992
The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Asia-Pacific region 1993
The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Caribbean region 1996
The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Mediterranean region 1997
The memorandum of understanding on port state control for the Indian Ocean region 1998
The memorandum of understanding on port state control for the west and central Africa region 1999
The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Black sea region 2000
Riyadh memorandum of understanding on port state control 2004
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Ship risk profile and Information system.



Administrative provisions.

4.3 PSC in Conventions

The legal ground for the jurisdiction of the port State can be found in UNCLOS,
which is mostly related to the issue of prevention of pollution. Article. 211(3) deals
with the legislative jurisdiction that empowers the State to establish its requirements
for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of the marine environment by
foreign vessels entered into its ports or territorial waters. However, the port Sate
should not hamper the right of innocent passage in its own territorial waters (UN,
1982).

According to Article 211(3), the port State has the right to commence investigation
into foreign vessels that are in one of its ports voluntarily by Article 218, and also the
port State may institute proceedings in its local court on the illegal discharge of a
pollutant. But the proceeding can be commenced only if the associated flag State
has made a request or the State where the pollution occurred or a State damaged or
otherwise threatened by it. In addition, according to Article 219, the port State
should take appropriate actions to a vessel in its port if the ship has violated the
international rules and standards in conjunction with the seaworthiness of vessels
that may threaten damage to the marine environment. It stipulates the detention of
vessels until the deficiencies have been removed and conditional release for sailing
to the nearest port for permanent repairs.

While UNCLOS provides the legal foundations of jurisdiction and broader features
of the port State’s authority, IMO instruments contain precise provisions relating to
the implementation of PSC inspections. In addition, while port State jurisdiction has
primarily developed concerning prevention of pollution in UNCLOS, IMO instruments
encompass not only pollution but also all safety-related issues such as ship design,
equipment, manning, and competence of seafarers.
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PSC requirements in the IMO instruments originated from the 1914 SOLAS
Convention which was created in response to the Titanic disaster. Even though the
responsibility for safety of ships lies with the flag State, States recognized the needs
to control foreign vessels at the early stages of international maritime Conventions,
and these values are successfully reflected in the major Conventions of IMO. The
IMO instruments which contain PSC provisions are;


SOLAS 74, reg. I/19, reg. IX/6 and reg. XI/4;



Load Line Convention 1966, Art. 21;



MARPOL 73/78, Art. 5, 6, reg. 8A of Annex I, reg. 15 of Annex II, reg. 8 of
Annex III and reg. 8 of Annex V;



STCW 78, Art. X and reg. I/4;



Tonnage Convention 1969, Art. 12;



International Convention on the control of harmful anti-fouling on the ships,
2001, Art. 11;



International Convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage, 1969, 1992
protocol.

The Maritime Labor Convention 2006 (MLC 2006), which is called one of the pillars
of maritime safety, also provides a PSC regime in Article V paragraph 4 by which a
port State may determine the compliance of a ship in its port with the requirements
of the Convention. In order to facilitate harmonized and unified inspections of the
PSC, IMO and ILO 30 have developed a number of guidelines. IMO has been
developing a variety of resolutions relating to PSC procedures and Res. A. 1052(27)
was adopted31 in 2011, and there are guidelines for particular Conventions which
are not incorporated in Res. A. 1052 (27), for instance, guidelines for PSC Ballast
Water Management (BWM), Hong Kong Convention, Anti-fouling system. Each
regional PSC MoU has also developed its inspection procedures on the basis of the
IMO guidelines.
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Guidelines for PSC Officers on Maritime Labour Convention, 2006
IMO Res. A. 787(19), A.882(21) which revoked by Res. A. 1052(27)

32

The PSC inspection begins with checking the validity of vessel’s certificates on the
grounds that flag State’s compliance with related Conventions should be verified.
However; if PSCO finds clear grounds that the vessel does not meet the required
regulations, the vessel is subjected to a detailed inspection. The ‘no more favorable
treatment32’ principle is applied to all vessels including those registered to nonparties to relevant Conventions which evidently enhances the PSC regime as an
influential safeguard in international shipping.

4.4 PSC practice in the Tokyo-MoU

The Tokyo MoU consists of 20 member States and one co-operating member. The
Secretariat is based in Tokyo and ‘The Asia-Pacific Computerized Information
System (APCIS)’ was established and coordinated by the Russian Federation.
According to Article 1.4 of the MoU, Member States determine the goal of
inspections annually by the percentage of individual foreign ships, and the
committee monitors the Members’ activities. The substantial target of inspections by
the committee is 80%, meanwhile, it was reported that Member States achieved
around 70% in 2015 (Tokyo MoU, 1993, 2016).

The New Inspection Regime (NIR) was introduced in 2014 for selecting vessels to
be inspected (Tokyo MoU, 2015). The NIR, risk profile based targeting, is
encouraged for use by the Member States for prioritizing and determining inspection
intervals other than in cases in which the port State was notified by another
Authority or other party relating to safety issues. The qualification of PSCO and
overall PSC procedures follow IMO Res. A. 1052(27). The MoU is undertaking a
joint concentrated inspection campaign (CIC) with Paris MoU on different issues
every year and publishes a report.

The MoU subdivided deficiencies into 566 codes by the nature of the deficiency
which is nearly authentic to that of Paris MoU. One attracting attention is ISMrelated deficiency Code. Tokyo MoU classifies the deficiency codes by ISM Code

32

SOLAS Protocol 78, Article II(3); MARPOL 73/78, Article 5(4); STCW 78, Article X(5)
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modules, for instance, 1501; Safety and environment policy, 15103; designated
person(s). It will be useful if the data accumulates in the future in analyzing the ISMrelated performances (Tokyo MoU, 2013). The deficiency action Code is the same
for other regional PSC MoUs.

In 2015, member States of the Tokyo-MoU carried out 31,407 inspections, and
1,153 vessels under 62 flags were detained, which is 3.67% of total inspections. The
MoU announced the Black-grey-white list based on the performance level of the flag
State over a three-year rolling period. The number of deficiencies per ship was 2.66
and the top three major vulnerable areas were fire safety measures, the safety of
navigation and life-saving appliances (Tokyo MoU, 2016).
4.5 Implications and roles of PSC

Port State Control has become the most effective measure for ridding the world’s
ports and oceans of substandard, unseaworthy and dangerous ships (Hare, 1997).
Owing to the regional agreement, the ‘safety net’ has been tighter which allows the
shipping industry to enjoy sound competition, while ship owners carrying on
business with poor investment in safety are confronted with serious difficulties.

Intensified PSC inspections motivate the shipping companies to maintain their fleet
compliance, and it has become a substantial measure to keep passengers and
seafarers safe even if some seafarers complain of the work burdens. Further, PSC
inspection has contributed to promoting seafarers’ awareness related to safety and
protection of the marine environment.

For flag States and classification societies, PSC inspection applies performance
pressure in the implementation of responsibility imposed by international
Conventions. The Black-grey-white list of flag States, published by regional MoUs,
has become a powerful tool to foster competition among flag States with regard to
their performance. Moreover, detention rates and RO responsible deficiencies in
regional PSC statistics has become an indicator of the evaluating performance of
classification societies.
34

The ‘safety net’ function of PSC has extended to the security issue and fair working
conditions and welfare of seafarers. Hence, the PSC regime implies not only
protecting port State interests but also serves a complementary function to the flag
State’s responsibility to ensure the safety of the ship and protection of the
environment.
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5. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Hypothesis

The ISM Code has great value in terms of providing a framework for a safety
management system for the company. However, the positive effect of the ISM Code
is not merely limited to the establishment of the SMS. The real virtue of the Code
lies in the implementation. Among other things, the continuous improvement in the
execution of the SMS should be highlighted since it permits enhancement of the
safety management system and awareness and understanding of all personnel
involved in SMS, and ultimately the prevention of marine accidents.

Identified non-conformity (NC) should be dealt with through various means of the
improvement mechanism. This self-regulating safety management system helps
the company to find what went wrong and eliminate the shortcomings of the SMS
and improve the safety management system. Once the typical NCs due to
improper safety management system are identified through near-miss or
deficiencies during the PSC inspection, the company should investigate them and
take necessary actions to prevent recurrence. This improvement mechanism keeps
the SMS dynamic, which is invaluable to the company.

In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISM Code, as reviewed in Chapter 2,
a variety of means have been attempted. The number of marine accidents,
insurance claims, PSC detention rates before and after the introduction of the ISM
Code were compared, and also comprehensive interviews were carried out and
analyzed. This paper, unlike previous studies, focused on the improvement
36

mechanism of the individual ship which can be an indicator to measure whether the
ISM Code works correctly or not.

Likewise, noting that the PSC inspection is the most effective and feasible indicator
to measure the safety level of an individual vessel, it should be possible to examine
the improvement mechanism of the ISM code by contrasting performance in an ISM
audit and PSC inspection. If the improvement mechanism works well, we can say
that the ISM Code works; on the other hand, if the mechanism does not work, the
ISM Code may be ineffective.

This dissertation aims to examine the effectiveness of the ISM Code, by using PSC
inspection data and ISM audits of sampled vessels through tracking the history of
two datasets. It will also explore how PSC inspection influences ISM audits. Thus,
the hypothesis of this dissertation is;


If the ISM Code works, improvements should be seen following a PSC
inspection or an ISM audit. Particularly, it would be represented by;


A good PSC performance following an ISM audit with bad performance.



A good performance in an ISM audit following a PSC inspection with
bad performance.



Partial or no relationship between two events by the nature of the
findings.



If the ISM Code does not work, improvement would not be seen - neither in
the PSC inspections before or after the audit. It would be represented by;


A bad PSC performance following an ISM audit with bad performance.



A bad performance in an ISM audit following PSC inspection with bad
performance.



Strong relationship between two events by the nature of the findings.

The Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesis.
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Figure 1 Hypothesis diagram

This paper will not discuss the dotted lines which resulted in a bad performance at
following ISM/PSC of good performance and ‘no or partial similarity’ after similarity
analysis. This is because it is difficult to determine whether the ISM Code works or
not solely by the number and limited data analysis, which needs to be elaborated
case by case. These cases may be affected by several options such as the collapse
of the SMS, false first ISM/PSC, and application of different measure at the following
event (i.e. Concentrated Inspection Campaign; CIC), temporary or partial
malfunctions of SMS and so on.
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5.2 Datasets
Considering the accessibility of the data, Korean vessel data was used. Datasets,
tabulated spreadsheets, relating to ISM audits and PSC inspection records were
collected from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) of the Republic of Korea,
the author’s home country. PSC inspection data was restricted to the inspection
records in the Tokyo MoU region. The ISM audit data was compiled by the Korean
Register of Shipping (KR) which carries out ISM audits on behalf of MOF.

The audit records are used for ships, not the company. And the Interim audit
records were left out of the ISM audit data because interim audit does not cover all
aspects of the ISM Code requirements so that it is difficult to determine the
effectiveness of the ISM Code. Meanwhile, the deficiencies related to the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) and Maritime Labor
Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) were excluded in the PSC data because ISPS and
MLC 2006 have their management systems verified by the flag State.

The time frame of both datasets ranged from 2011 to 2015; a period of 5 years.
During that time frame, Korean vessels underwent 6,972 PSC inspections with
24,711 deficiencies, and 44 detentions in the Tokyo MoU region. In the meantime,
1,402 ISM audits were undertaken with 2,743 minor NCs and 69 major NCs. Due to
the enormous amount of data, it was decided to decrease the timeframe to between
the 2nd half of 2013 and 2015 (2.5 years). To maintain the consistency of PSC data,
the PSC inspection data used is from 2014 when NIR was introduced in the Tokyo
MoU region, while the ISM data is from the 2nd half of 2013. Five hundred and
ninety-two vessels were selected based on the condition that vessels have audit
records since the 2nd half of 2013 as well as PSC inspection records after 1 January
2014

To determine how the improvement mechanism works as time passes, namely,
how an ISM audit impacts the following PSC inspection or how a PSC inspection
influences the following ISM audit in the different time interval between two events,
vessels with 0~180 days and 181~365 days between inspections and audits were
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selected. Vessels were not duplicated. For example, if a ship had undergone an ISM
audit on a certain day (T1) and the ship received a PSC inspection on a certain day
after T1 (T2), the number of days between the two events will be T2 minus T133. In
the 180 day interval category, 275 vessels with ISM audit records followed by PSC
inspection records were selected, and similarly 174 vessels with PSC inspection
records followed by ISM audit records were selected. In the same manner, 74
vessels with ISM audits followed by PSC inspections and 32 vessels with PSC
inspections followed by ISM audits were derived from datasets with 365 days apart.

Only those vessels that did not undergo any ISM audit or PSC inspection between
two events were chosen, which would allow us to observe the immediate impact on
the following event. The reason why the data group in the 365 day interval category
was smaller than the 180 day group can be explained by repetitive PSC inspections
with indiscriminate targeting practice. Among the 592 vessels, there were 37 vessels
intervals beyond 365 days or erroneous entries, which were omitted from the
analysis.
Table 2 Number of vessels with 180 days and 365 days intervals between two events

Intervals

ISM audit first

PSC inspection
first

Total

0~180 Days

275

174

449

181~365 Days

74

32

106

Total

349

206

555

Remark

37 vessels with
invalid intervals

Finally, the dataset was reduced to 50 vessels for four cases34 by using random
sampling other than the case of PSC inspection followed by ISM audit with 365 day
interval because there were only 32 applicable vessels available in that category.
182 vessels, therefore, were employed in the analysis.
33

34

If ISM audit carried out in 1 January 2014 and then first PSC inspection after the audit was done in
31 October 2014, there is 10 months (approximately 300 days) interval between two events.
① ISM audit followed by PSC inspection with 180 days interval, ② PSC inspection followed by
ISM audit with 180 days interval, ③ ISM audit followed by PSC inspection with 365 days interval,
④ PSC inspection followed by ISM audit with 365 days interval
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5.3 Methodology

This paper is a comparative analysis to determine whether or not the ISM Code
works by analyzing the records of ISM audits and PSC inspections. Thus, the ISM
audits and PSC inspection datasets for 182 vessels were combined into one dataset.
The data of 182 vessels with corresponding records was taken from both datasets.
The data from the PSC dataset includes the date of inspection, the number of
deficiencies, and description of the deficiencies. The ISM audit records also
contained the date of the audit, the number of NCs and description of the NCs.

During the analysis of the integrated datasets, the improvement in each vessel in
response to the leading event was examined in the following event. This thesis
classified the performance level into two groups for ISM audit and PSC inspection,
good performer and bad performer, for simple conceptualization. Taking into
account the average number of deficiencies per ship in the Tokyo MoU35 and NCs36
from the audit of Korean vessels in the past five years, a vessel was categorized as
a good performer if deficiencies or NCs were fewer than three, which means zero to
two. Ships with three or more than three deficiencies or NCs were classified as the
bad performers.


Good performers ≤ 2 findings (NCs or Def.)



Bad performers ≥ 3 findings (NCs or Def.)

In determining the areas of improvement, all NCs and deficiencies were classified
according to the nature of the problems by the ISM modules ranging from safety and
environmental policy in section 2 to company verification, review, and evaluation in
section 12 as shown in Table 3. A careful examination determined which modules
should be subject to NCs and deficiencies based on the ISM Code requirements

35

Deficiencies per inspection was 2.66 according to 2015 annual report of Tokyo MoU, (83,606
deficiencies / 31,407 inspections)
36
During 2011 to 2015, 2,812 NCs were identified in 1,402 vessels in the ISM audits in Korean vessels,
which means average number of NC per audit was 2.0
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and relevant guidelines. This work provides an understanding of whether or not the
ship undertook an improvement mechanism. It could be noted, for example, that the
improvement mechanism of ship ‘A’ has worked if ship ‘A’ has no deficiency in
‘emergency preparedness at PSC inspection, following an ISM audit with NCs
relating to the ‘emergency preparedness.’

In the course of classification, it was found that certain deficiencies and NCs could
be subject to multiple ISM modules. If PSCO, for instance, identified a deficiency
whereby the battery for starting a lifeboat engine was not charged, it was classified
as ‘maintenance of the ship and equipment’ rather than ‘emergency preparedness’.
The work of classification was carried out in a point of identifying the ultimate
problematic issue which led to the deficiency.
Table 3 ISM Code module
Module

Title

2

Safety and environmental policy

3

Company responsibility and authority

4

Designated person(s)

5

Master’s responsibility and authority

6

Resource and personnel

7

Shipboard operations

8

Emergency preparedness

9

Reports and analysis of Non-Conformities, accidents and hazardous
occurrences

10

Maintenance of the ship and equipment

11

Documentation

12

Company verification, review and evaluation

Furthermore, by using this codification, the similarity of the performance, and the
nature of the problems will be analyzed to ensure the cause and effect relationship
between ISM audit and PSC inspection of the individual ship. The similarity formula
was developed with criteria of the level of similarity to provide a clear picture. If the
percentage of the similarity is 50% or more than 50% according to the calculation, it
might be said that a strong relationship exists with the previous audit or inspection. If
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the percentage of similarity is between 1 and 49, it was categorized as partial
similarity.
Similarity (%) = [(Nnc-t1 or Ndef-t1 / Nt1) X (Ndef-t2 or Nnc-t2 / Nt2)] X 100



Nnc-t1 : Number of NC in the ISM audit followed by PSC inspection



Ndef-t1 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection followed by ISM audit



Nt1 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the preceding event



Ndef-t2 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection following ISM audit



Nnc-t2 : Number of NC in the ISM audit following PSC inspection



Nt2 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the following event



Criteria of Similarity : Strong - more than 50%, Partial - 1~49%, No – 0

In the case of N/A, since the similarity cannot be calculated if there were no
findings in the leading event, it was classified as N/A. In contrast, if there were no
findings in the following event, although the similarity cannot be calculated, it was
categorized as no relationship since this paper is looking for the impact of the
leading event.

Table 4 Example of similarity calculations
ISM NCs
(PSC deficiencies)

PSC deficiencies
(ISM NCs)

Calculation

Result

5, 6, 8, 8, 10, 10

10,10, 4

[ (2/6) X (2/3) ] X 100 = 22.2 %

Partial

9,10,12

10

[ (1/3) X 1 ] X 100 = 33.3%

Partial

10,10

10,11

[ 1 X (1/2) ] X 100 = 50%

Strong

8,9,10

11

-

No

-

10

-

N/A

7

-

-

No
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6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

6.1 Analysis of ISM audit followed by PSC inspection (ISM-first group)

6.1.1 Overview of ISM-first group.

The NCs in the ISM audit and deficiencies in the following PSC inspection of each
sampled ship (50) were contrasted by number to examine how the ISM audit
impacted the following PSC inspection. Table 5 shows that the number of NCs when
the interval was 180 days (hereinafter ‘short term’) was larger than when the interval
was between 181 and 365 days (hereinafter ‘long term’), whereas the deficiencies in
the PSC were reversed.
Table 5 Total number of NCs and Def. in two timeframes
Time

NCs

NCs/ship

Def.

Def./ship

0~180 D

102

2.04

137

2.74

181~365 D

81

1.62

161

3.22
(Unit: pcs / ships)

200

161
137

150
102

81

100

NCs
Def.

50
0
0~180 D

181~365 D

Figure 2 Number of NCs/Def. of ISM-first group
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6.1.2 Analysis by the number of findings

Table 6 describes the number of ships contrasted by the number of NCs and
deficiencies in the short term period. This table permits us to see how a particular
ship with a certain number of NCs presented performances in the following PSC
inspection. Namely, we can picture how the ISM audit impacts on the following PSC
inspection and whether the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code works or not.
Statistical analysis was derived as follows;


58% of Ships (29) had the same or higher number of NCs than the number
of deficiencies in the following PSC inspection.



Nineteen ships had no deficiency and 56% of ships (28) had good
performances in the following PSC inspection.



Among ships with good performance in the ISM audit (34), 70.6% of ships
(24) maintained good performance in the PSC inspection, while 29.4% of
ships (10) showed the same or worse performance in the PSC inspection.



Among ships with bad performances in the ISM audit (16), 25% of ships (4)
showed improvement in the PSC inspection, while 75% of ships (12)
showed the same or worse performance in the PSC inspection.

Table 6 Number of ships compared by the number of NCs and Def. in short term
Number of deficiencies

Number
of NCs

0

0

9

1

4

2

4

1

2

3

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

3
4

2
2

5

4

5

6

8

2

1

1

1

11

1

5
1

1

7

1

1

Total

11

1

1

4

11

12

4

3

5
1

1
5

10

1

1
1

19

9

1

7
Total

7

1
2

1

2

4
2

1

1

50
(unit: ships)
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In summary, 70.6% of ships among good performers in the ISM audit maintained
their good performance in the following PSC inspections, while 29.4% of ships
became worse. Meanwhile, 25% of ships among bad performers in the ISM audit
exhibited improvement in their performance in the following PSC inspections, while
75% of them showed the same or worse performance level.

Therefore, it could be appreciated that the good performers in the ISM audit also
show good performance in the PSC inspection, in general, which is normal.
Simultaneously, the majority of bad performers maintain the same or worse
performances category in the PSC inspection, which possibly indicates that the SMS
does not work effectively on improvement. However, it was seen that good
performers in the ISM Code have positive results on the following PSC inspection in
the short term.

Table 7 presents the number of ships contrasted by the number of NCs and
deficiencies in the long term period. By analyzing the different timeframe, it would be
possible to see how the ISM audit influences the following PSC inspection as time
goes by. Statistical analysis was derived as follows;


56% of Ships (28) had the same or higher number of NCs than the number
of deficiencies in the following PSC inspection. However, the total number
of deficiencies was increased compared to the short term.



Eighteen ships had no deficiency and interestingly, identical with the short
term, 56% of ships (28) had good performance in the following PSC
inspection.



Among ships with good performance in the ISM audit (35), only 51.4 % of
ships (18) maintained good performance in the following PSC inspection,
while 48.6 % of ships (17) showed the worse performances in the following
PSC inspection.



Among ships with bad performance in the ISM audit (15), 75% of ships (10)
showed improvement in the PSC inspection, while 25 % of ships (5) showed
same or worse performances in the PSC inspection.
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Table 7 Number of ships compared by the number of NCs and Def. in long term
Number
of NCs

Number of deficiencies
0

1

2

0

8

1

1

1

1

2

4

3

1

4

3

3

4

5

2

1

4

1

2

1

1

3

7

9

1
1

10

11

1
1

12

21

1
1

19
1

6

1

1

7

1

5
1

6

1
1

Total

18

10

1

1

7

Total

1

1

5

6

1
1

5

5

3

5

5

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

50
(unit: ships)

According to Table 7, among good performers in the ISM audit, 51.4% of ships
maintained their good performance in the following PSC inspection, while 48.6% of
them got worse. In the meantime, 75% of ships among bad performers in the ISM
audit improved their performance in the following PSC inspection, while 25% of
them stayed at the same or worse performance level.

It should be noted primarily that the bad performers make a remarkable
improvement in the long term period, which is a different outcome from the short
term period although the number of deficiencies was larger compared to the short
term. It is also found that the increase in the number of deficiencies in the long term
period was primarily concentrated in the good performers in the ISM audit, which
resulted in the good performer’s degradation. Declined performances of good
performers are a somewhat expected result.
6.1.3 Similarity analysis

It would not be sufficient to conclude that the decrease in the number of findings
represents a positive impact of the ISM audit on the following PSC inspection. For
example, if a ship that was given five NCs including two NCs relating to ‘Master’s
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responsibility’ in the ISM audit received three deficiencies concerning ‘Master’s
responsibility’ in the following PSC inspection, we could not simply say that the ship
made an improvement due to the reduction of findings. Instead, it should be noted
that the management system has not shown improvement because the ship
revealed similar deficiencies in the following PSC inspection, which indicates that
the improvement mechanism has not worked properly.

The strong similarity, therefore, in findings between two events could be
understood as evidence for the improper implementation of the ISM Code. If a ship
has a strong similarity in the following event, it could be that the ship has not made
an improvement; conversely, if a ship has no similarity, then it could mean that the
ship has some improvement. Of course, there will be some different cases in which
this cause and effect relationship does not work if both events have a different focus
in terms of enforcement. However, the cause and effect relationship can be
measured by the similarity analysis in general between ISM and PSC.
The higher number of ‘no similarity’ or ‘partial similarities’ will show fewer
repetitions of the same deficiencies in the PSC inspection. In order to examine the
similarity, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the findings, NCs and deficiencies, were
coded by the ISM module, which is the requirement same as the section of Part A of
the ISM Code. The calculation formula is as follows;
Similarity (%) = [(Nnc-t1 or Ndef-t1 / Nt1) X (Ndef-t2 or Nnc-t2 / Nt2)] X 100








Nnc-t1 : Number of NC in the ISM audit followed by PSC inspection
Ndef-t1 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection followed by ISM audit
Nt1 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the preceding event
Ndef-t2 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection following ISM audit
Nnc-t2 : Number of NC in the ISM audit following PSC inspection
Nt2 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the following event
Criteria of Similarity : Strong - more than 50%, Partial - 1~49%, No - 0

Table 8 shows the results of the similarity analysis of the ISM-first group. Each
number in the table indicates the number of ships with the corresponding similarity
degree derived by the above calculation formula. N/A represents case in which a
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ship with no NC has recorded more than one deficiency in the following PSC
inspection.
Table 8 Similarity comparison by the timeframe
Degree

No

Part

Strong

N/A

Total

0~180D

24

9

14

3

50

181~365D

23

11

5

11

50
(unit: ships)

It illustrates that fourteen ships in the short term have strong similarity, while there
are five ships with strong similarity in the long term period. For the fourteen ships
with strong similarity in the short term, it can be inferred that similar findings were
repeated at the following PSC, which resulted in 75% of ships with same or worse
performances. The number of ships with strong similarity in the long term is only five,
which supports the explanation indirectly that 75% of ships improved their
performance in the long term as discussed above.

But it needs to be understood that the reduction in the number of ships with strong
similarity does not necessarily mean that all ships in the long term made the
improvement because of N/A. So it is necessary to examine the number of N/A in
the long term, which is higher than in the short term. These ships with N/A are the
cases, mentioned at the end of the 6.1.2, which contributed to the rise in
deficiencies concentrated on the good performers in the ISM audit. It reveals that
the similarity is not a robust indicator to measure improvement, but still it has a
strong implication if other factors such as nature of the finding are evaluated
accordingly.

However, if the similarity is compared to the bad performers, there was only one
bad performer with strong similarity in the long term while there were ten bad
performers with strong similarity in the short term. Since the bad performers are
ships with three or more NCs, the strong similarity directly means the repetition of
the problems in the following event. Therefore, the conclusion could be made that
the bad performers in the ISM audit improved with the passage of time.
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Table 9 Similarity by the performance
0~180D

Similarity

181~365D

Bad

Good

Total

Bad

Good

Total

2

22

24

8

15

23

Part

4

5

9

6

5

11

Strong

10

4

14

1

4

5

3

3

11

11

34

50

35

50
(unit: ships)

No

N/A
Total

16

15

If the similarity is compared with the nature of the findings to confirm the similarity
analysis, it becomes apparent and gives a clearer picture. Table 10 and Table 11
show a comparison between the similarity and NCs coded by the ISM module. It can
be seen from Table 10 that, for instances of the strong similarity, all ships with 51
NCs in the ISM audit, which means that ships with half of the total number of NCs,
have the strong similarity with the deficiencies at the following PSC inspection.

In terms of NCs by ISM module, module 10 represents the highest number of NCs,
which indicates that ships with NCs related to maintenance issues have taken
similar deficiencies in the following PSC inspections. It can also be seen that ships
with NCs related to modules 6, 7, and 8 have similar deficiencies in the following
PSC inspection.

Table 10 Comparison of similarity and NCs by the ISM module in short term
Number of NCs coded by ISM module

Module↘
Similarity

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

No

1

2

1

6

2

3

9

Part

1

2

2

3

2

3

10

Strong

1

1

6

5

8

2

28

3

5

9

14

12

8

47

11

1

12

Total

1

25

2

26
51

37

N/A

Total

1

3

102
(unit: pcs)

37

In the ISM-first group N/A is zero since N/A is the case that of some deficiencies in the PSC
inspection with no NC in the previous ISM audit (Refer to the Chapter 5)
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When it comes to the longer period, the NCs with strong similarity decrease
drastically in nearly every ISM module. With this, apart from whether the ISM Code
works or not, it is possible to say that, at least, ships with NCs rarely repeat similar
deficiencies in the following PSC inspection in the long term. In other words, this
represents indirectly that some dynamic activities were carried out to avoid similar
nature of deficiencies in the wake of the ISM audit.
Table 11 Comparison of similarity and NCs by the ISM module in long term
Number of NCs coded by ISM module

Module↘
Similarity
No

2

3

4

2

Part

1

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

5

5

7

3

5

10

3

2

42

4

3

5

1

1

15

1

31

Strong

1

6

1

31

4

8

N/A
Total

2

1

9

8

13

4

6

3

81
(unit: pcs)

In summary, there was high similarity in the findings between NCs and deficiencies
in the short term period, particularly in maintenance issues, while the long term data
showed little similarity. It can be affirmed that the similarity analysis correspond to
the results of the analysis by the number of findings as the hypothesis expected.
6.1.4 Analysis by the nature of findings

In analyzing the ISM-first group, it was found that the ISM audit has a notable
impact on the following PSC inspection in the long term, whereas relatively little
impact was found in the short term. Then next step should be to verify which areas
of the NCs are effective and ineffective to the following PSC inspection. As
mentioned in 6.1.3, the findings coded by the ISM module were compared by the
number of findings and portions.
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By means of this, the relative importance could be determined along with the
percentage of findings in the respective events by the ISM module. It is also
possible to check the variations in nature of deficiencies in the following PSC
inspection, which reveals which modules were effective, and why the ISM-first group
made more improvement in the long term. Table 12 and Table 13 illustrate the
outcome of this analysis in the short term and long term period.

It was found that there were different degrees of variations as time passed.
Findings noted through Table 12 and Table 13 are as follows;


Module 9 was the most effective in both timeframes.



Modules 5, and 7 showed improvement in both timeframes and were
notably strengthened with the passage of time



Modules 8, and 10 were ineffective particularly as time passed



Modules 3, 4, 6, and 12 had positive impacts and remained at a similar level
regardless of the passage of time
Table 12 Findings by the ISM module in short term

Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

ISM

0/0

3/2.9

0/0

5/4.9

9/8.8

14/13.7

12/11.8

8/7.8

47/46.2

1/1

3/2.9

102/100

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

5/3.7

13/9.4

14/10.2

14/10.2

0/0

86/62.8

5/3.7

0/0

137/100

Diff.(%)

0

-2.9

0

-1.2

+0.6

-3.5

-1.6

-7.8

+16.6

+2.7

-2.9

-

(Unit: pcs / %)

In the short term period, the PSC inspection made some improvement in modules
3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12 while in the long term period showed improvement in modules 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. More specially, this tells us that the ISM audits primarily impact
the Master’s responsibility (module 5) and shipboard operations (module 7) as time
passes. In addition to those modules, but most of the modules showed improvement
along with the passage of time, supporting the analysis results in 6.1.2.
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Table 13 Findings by the ISM module in long term
Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

ISM

0/0

2/2.5

1/1.2

9/11.1

8/9.9

13/16.0

4/5.0

6/7.4

31/38.3

4/4.9

3/3.7

81/100

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

3/1.9

13/8.1

12/7.5

20/12.4

1/0.5

100/62.1

12/7.5

0/0

161/100

Diff.(%)

0

-2.5

-1.2

-9.2

-1.8

-8.5

+7.4

-6.9

+23.8

+2.6

-3.7

-

(Unit: pcs / %)

The ISM audit provided slight effects on company’s responsibility (module 3),
designated person (DP, module 4), resource and personnel (module 6), and
company’s verification (module 12). However, it was seen that the ISM audit did not
have a clear impact on emergency preparedness (module 8), maintenance (module
10), or documentation (module 11).

Regarding Reporting accident and hazardous occurrence (module 9), it seemingly
needs to be investigated more despite the fact that it showed the most significant
improvement in the following PSC inspection. This might be because PSC does not
look deeply into the management system without clear grounds. And also there
were only a few deficiencies exhibited in the dataset. Therefore, it is difficult to rely
on what the figure says and it seems to require more elaboration.

The picture becomes clearer when the analysis by nature of the findings is applied
to bad performers. Table 14 and Table 15 indicate the analysis of bad performer
findings by ISM module. From those tables, it is indicated that;


Only module 9 showed effectiveness, and module 10 became worse in the
short term.



Most of the modules, except for module 9, were at a similar level in the
short term.
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Table 14 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in short term
Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

ISM

0/0

1/1.5

0/0

1/1.5

6/8.7

8/11.6

9/13.0

6/8.7

35/50.7

1/1.5

2/2.8

69/100

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

2/2.6

8/10.6

7/9.2

9/11.8

0/0

48/63.2

2/2.6

0/0

76/100

Diff.(%)

0

-1.5

0

+1.1

+1.9

-2.4

-1.2

-8.7

+12.5

+1.1

-2.8

-

(Unit: pcs / %)



Modules 3, 5, 7, 9, and 12 showed good progresses in the long term.



Modules 8, and 10 got worse in the long term period.
Table 15 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in long term

Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

ISM

0/0

2/3.4

1/1.7

8/13.6

4/6.8

11/18.6

3/5.1

4/6.8

19/32.2

4/6.7

3/5.1

59/100

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

0/0

2/7.1

0/0

7/25.0

0/0

17/60.7

2/7.2

0/0

28/100

Diff.(%)

0

-3.4

-1.7

-13.6

+0.3

-18.6

+19.9

-6.8

+28.5

+0.5

-5.1

-

(Unit: pcs / %)

Hereupon, it can be said that the ISM audit had a weak impact on the following
PSC in the short term, except for module 9 in the group of bad performers, and even
module 10 became worse. There were not many variations in improvement or
deterioration in the short term. However, intense changes were recorded in the long
term. This indicates that the ISM audit had a strong positive influence on the overall
modules in the long term; in particular, there were remarkable improvements in the
master’s responsibility, and shipboard operation aspects.
6.1.5 Discussions

As suggested in Chapter 5, it was expected that, if the ISM Code works, a good
performance would be seen in the PSC inspection if the starting point was a bad
performance in the ISM audit. A partial or no relationship also should be found
between the NCs and deficiencies. In order to test the hypothesis, three methods
were used; compared by the number, similarity analysis, and by the nature of the
findings.
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It was consistently observed through those methods that improvement was made
in the long term period, and more importantly, the bad performers in the long term
have made a lot of positive progress. Table 16 summarizes the performance
analysis. The table indicates that irrespective of the performance level in the ISM
audit, there were not many performance variations at the next PSC inspection in the
short term period, while the long term showed significant differences.
Table 16 Performances comparisons by the time passage
Performance

Good performers

Bad performers

Time frame

0~180D

181~365D

0~180D

181~365D

Maintained or Improved

70.6%

51.4%

25.0%

75.0%

Similar or worsen

29.4%

48.6%

75.0%

25.0%

In the short term period, performance in the ISM audit maintained the same
condition in 70~75% of cases. Namely, most of the bad performers in the ISM audit
stayed in the PSC bad performers group, and ISM good performers remained in the
good performer's group in the following PSC inspection. This was supported by the
similarity analysis in Table 9 wherein 10 out of 16 bad performers in the ISM Code
showed strong similarity, which implies that 62.5% of bad performers repeated
similar problematic shipboard activities. And the similar performance was also seen
by the nature of the findings in Table 12 wherein the PSC deficiencies showed
nearly similar outcomes with the previous ISM audit, except for module 9.

This can occur when the same SMS is applied in the same manner without
changes, for instance, if the SMS changed in the wrong way, it would create more
problems. Contrariwise, if the SMS changed in a positive way, the system would
achieve some improvement. Despite the 25% of improvement in the bad performers,
and the 29.4% worse performance in the good performers, which are not meaningful
in general, it could be concluded that the SMS in the short term timeframe is not
showing dynamic changes by the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code. In
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other words, the ISM Code is seemingly not working effectively in short term period
for the ISM-first group.

In contrast, in the long term, only approximately half of the good performers
maintained their performance level, while 75% of the bad performers made
improvements in the following PSC inspection. While good performers did not
maintain their condition as time passed, the bad performers achieved huge
improvements. Regarding bad performers’ improvement, as demonstrated in Table
9, only one out of 15 bad performers showed strong similarity with deficiencies in the
following PSC inspection. This is a sign that the bad performers have worked on
their vulnerabilities or at least made some positive progress to avoid the same
deficiencies at subsequent PSC inspections.

Furthermore, it was found that the ISM audit has an impact on the overall safety
management system. According to Table 13, it was underlined that the ISM audit
impacted on the PSC inspection in the overall modules other than 8, 10, and 11 and
the magnitude of the improvement became stronger as time passed. Moreover, bad
performers

presented

clear

enhanced

performances

relating

to

Master’s

responsibility, and shipboard operations in Table 15, which are impossible to
progress without systematic approaches. This evidently corresponds to the
hypothesis. So it might be possible to conclude that the improvement mechanism of
SMS is functioning in the long term period, which means the ISM Code is working
properly.

Apart from the conclusion, a question arises as to why the good performers were
unable to maintain their performances as time passed. This might be explained by
the limitation of the certification and the capacity of shore-based management. The
good performers might have a good SMS with well-trained seafarers at the time of
the audit. However, to maintain the performance, everyone involved in the SMS
should exert constant efforts to cope with various dynamic, internal and external
factors such as crew, training, maintenance, and new rules.
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In practical terms, it is difficult for seafarers and companies to maintain their
highest attention until the next verification. The same practice is seen in the
periodical survey. In this regard, the role of shore-based management is paramount
in maintaining the safety system. It may be inevitable to decline to some extent, but
the key concern should be how to maintain a high level performance and how often
the PSC inspection should monitor it.

In contrast, the bad performers gained positive results as time went by. This result
could be explained by the traits of the ISM audit and improvement mechanism of the
Code. As seen in Tables 12, and 13, the ISM audit mainly identified findings in the
procedure-related modules such as modules 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. This is because,
unlike PSCO, the auditor does not focus much on immediate defects; instead
auditors try to find underlying shortcomings of the system itself and improper
execution of the SMS through records and interviews.

When looking at improvement areas of the bad performers in Table 15, the bad
performers in the long term made progress in nearly every module. In particular,
strong improvement was made in modules 5, and 7, which require a long time to
take corrective actions. For instance, if NCs in shipboard operations (module 7)
were identified during the audit, the corrective action should go through the revision
of the SMS, distributing, training and evaluation processes. Therefore, it can be
understood that the time-consuming nature of NCs results in fewer effects on the
improvement mechanism in the short term, which was probably under the process.
This can be another explanation for why positive effects of the ISM audit are
revealed in the long term, not in the short term.
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6.1.6 Summary of analysis of the ISM-first group

Key findings from analysis in 6.1 are as follows;

In the short term


Most of the good performers in the ISM show good performance.



The majority of bad performers remain in the bad performance category.

In the long term


Good performers in the ISM audits show declined performances.



Bad performers make remarkable improvement in many areas of SMS.

We could see that the ISM audit does not provide much impact on the following
PSC inspection in the short term, which implies that the improvement mechanism
probably does not work efficiently in that timeframe. In regard to the declining
performance of the good performer, the significance of the constant shore-based
attention to and management of the shipboard activities after the ISM audit is
highlighted.

Furthermore, it is confirmed that the ISM audit has a positive impact on the
following PSC inspection in the long term, which implies that positive effects of the
ISM audit are revealed in the long term. It was also found by evaluating the safety
management areas coded by the ISM module that there are improvements in many
aspects compared to the short term period.

This can be attributed to the fact that it requires a certain time to reflect the findings
into its SMS and internalize the procedures into real shipboard activities, and the
effect of the improvement mechanism comes after a certain time period. It might be
possible to say that the ISM Code is working properly in the long term period on the
grounds of which the improvement mechanism of the SMS works correctly.
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6.2 Analysis of PSC inspection followed by ISM audit (PSC-first group)

6.2.1 Overview of PSC-first group

The deficiencies in the PSC inspection and NCs in the following ISM audit of each
sampled ship (50, 32) were contrasted by number to examine how the PSC
inspection results impacted the following ISM audit. Table 17 shows that the number
of deficiencies per ship in the short the term was higher than in the long term,
whereas the NCs per ship in the following ISM audits showed the same tendency.
Table 17 Total number of Def. and NCs in two timeframes
Time

Def.

Def./ship

NCs

NCs/ship

0~180D

155

3.1

133

2.7

181~365D

92

2.9

74

2.3
(Unit: pcs)

200
155

150

133
92

100

74

Def.
NCs

50
0
0~180 D

181~365 D

Figure 3 Number of Def./NCs of PSC-first group

6.2.2 Analysis by the number of findings

Table 18 exhibits the number of ships contrasted by the number of deficiencies and
NCs in the short term period. This table indicates how a particular ship with a certain
number of deficiencies undertook performances in the following ISM audit. It
demonstrates the impact of the PSC inspection on the following ISM audit. As in
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section 6.1.2, whether or not the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code works
can be measured because PSC deficiencies should be taken as non-conformity with
the SMS and thereby the ship operators have to take corrective actions. Statistical
analysis is derived as follows;



48% of ships (24) had the same or higher number of deficiencies than the
number of NCs in the following ISM audit.



Nine ships had no NC and 52% of ships (26) had good performance in the
following ISM audit.



Among ships with good performance in the PSC inspection (29), 62.1% of
ships maintained good performance in the ISM audit (18), while 37.9% of
ships (11) showed the worse performance in the ISM audit.



Among ships with bad performance in the PSC inspection (21), 38.1% of
ships (8) showed improvement in the ISM audit, while 61.9% of ships (13)
showed similar performance.

Table 18 Number of ships compared by the number of Def. and NCs in short term
Number
of Def.

Number of NCs
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

2

3

7

1

2

1

1

1

1

3

2

1

3

2

4
2

1

1

1

2

1

1

5

1

1

6

1

1

1

7
1

5
1

9

1

2

1

1

4

1

6

1

2

13

1

15

1

16
8

9

6

1
1

1
9

Total
18

1

4

Total

8

1
9

4

3

1

1
50
(Unit: ships)

We can see from above that 62.1% of ships among good performers in the PSC
inspection maintained their good performance in the following ISM audit; while 37.9%
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of ships showed a worse condition. In the meantime, 38.1% of ships among bad
performers exhibited improvement, whereas 61.9% showed worse performance.

The majority of good performers had good performance, which is quite similar to
the ISM-first group. On the other hand, the bad performers showed approximately
40% improvements, which might be a signal that the improvement mechanism is
working to some extent. But still, around 60% of bad performers remained at the
similar levels.

Table 19 illustrates the number of ships compared with the number of deficiencies
and NCs in the long period. It was analyzed as follows;


59.4% of ships (19) had the same or higher number of deficiencies than the
number of NCs in the following ISM audit.



Six ships had no NC and 62.5% ships (20) showed good performance in the
following ISM audit.



Among ships with good performance in the PSC inspection (20), 65.0% of
ships maintained good performance in the ISM audit (13), while 35.0% of
ships showed the same or worse performance (7).



Among ships with bad performance in the PSC inspection (12), 58.3% of
ships showed improvement in the following ISM audit (7), while 41.7% of
ships showed similar or worse performance (5).

To summarize, 65% of good performers in the PSC inspection showed the same or
improved performance in the following ISM audit, while 35% showed got worse. In
the bad performers group, 58.3% of ships showed better performance in the
following ISM audit, while 41.7% of ships did not. The good performers, in the long
term, maintained their good performance to a relatively high level which is almost
similar to the short term, which suggests a point for deliberation, taking into account
the deterioration of performance as time passes, which is quite reasonable, unlike
the ISM-first group. Also, it needs to be highlighted that the bad performers
improved even though the extent of improvement was limited compared to the ISMfirst group.
61

Table 19 Number of ships compared by the number of Def. and NCs in long term
Number of ships by number of NCs

Number
of Def

0

1

2

3

4

5

0

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

4

2

1

1

1

2

3

9
6
5
1

2

3

1

1
1

2

3

1

1

14
Total

Total

1

1

6
8

8

1

4
5

6

1

3

1
6

8

6

1

3

4

3

1

1

32
(Unit: ships)

6.2.3 Similarity analysis

The results of the similarity analysis on the PSC-first group are shown in Table 20,
indicating how ships responded to the deficiencies identified in the PSC inspection.
The ships with strong similarity in the short term represented only 14% of all ships,
which reflects the fair performance of the PSC-first group in the short term period
compared to the ISM-first group. And also there were only four ships with strong
similarity in the long term period, which is 12.5%. As such, only a general
impression is given that the deficiencies do not repeat in the following ISM audit in
the PSC-first group. But variations on the findings should be investigated more
thoroughly.
Table 20 Similarity comparison by the timeframe
Degree

No

Part

Strong

N/A

Total

0~180D

14

13

7

16

50

181~365D

15

6

4

7

32
(unit: ships)
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With regard to the comparison of the performance, Table 21 indicates that only one
bad performer presented strong similarity in the long term, while five ships showed
strong similarity in the short term. It does not give a clear distinction between the two
timeframes; however, at least it gives some impression that the deficiencies in the
PSC-first group do not repeat similar NCs at the next ISM audit regardless of the
performance level.
Table 21 Similarity by the performance
Similarity

0~180D

181~365D

Bad

Good

Total

Bad

Good

Total

No
Part
Strong
N/A

5
11
5

9
2
2
16

14
13
7
16

6
5
1

9
1
3
7

15
6
4
7

Total

21

29

50

12

20

32
(unit: ships)

If the similarity is compared by the nature of the findings, it becomes more
apparent. Table 22 and Table 23 show the comparison between the similarity and
deficiencies coded by ISM module. These tables imply that if there are many strong
similarities, the ships tend to maintain a similar level of performance.

Table 22 illustrates this trend in the short term, for instance, all ships with 46
deficiencies in the PSC inspection have the strong similarity with the NCs at the
following ISM audit, which means that ships with around 30% of total deficiencies
have the strong similarity with the NCs at the following ISM audit. This is different
results from the ISM-first group, which indicates that the PSC-fist group has fewer
repetitions of similar findings in the short term compared to the ISM-first group.

In the long term period, the deficiencies with strong similarity decreased further.
The deficiencies are mostly found in the partial and no relation area. Specifically,
despite the low number of deficiencies due to the smaller size of the dataset, the
number of “no similarity” in module 10 is higher than short term period. Hence, the
table reveals that, at least, ships in the long term did not take many NCs in similar
areas at the following ISM audit
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Table 22 Comparison of similarity and Def. by the ISM module in short term
Number of Def. coded by ISM module

Module↘
Similarity

2

3

4

No

5

6

7

8

2

3

1

8
5

Part
Strong

1

9

10

11

12

5

18

5

34

6

15

36

10

75

5

5

26

4

46

Total

N/A

0

Total

3

16

12

25

80

19

155
(unit: pcs)

Table 23 Comparison of similarity and Def. by the ISM module in long term
Module↘
Similarity

Number of Def. coded by ISM module
5

6

7

8

2

3

1

Part

1

5

Strong

1

No

2

3

4

9

10

11

12

2

36

6

50

1

21

5

33

7

1

9

N/A
Total

Total

0
2

5

6

3

64

12

92
(unit: pcs)

6.2.4 Analysis by the nature of findings

The deficiencies and NCs were coded by the ISM Code as in 6.1.4, and compared
with each other by timeframe. The PSC inspection results in each module of the
SMS can be seen by this analysis. In the ISM-first group, it was found that the ISM
audit influenced the following PSC inspection in many aspects of the SMS but the
result was somewhat different in the PSC-first group. The findings can be found in
Table 24 and Table 25 as follows;



Modules 8, 10, and 11 showed effectiveness in the short term.



Modules 10, and 11 showed effectiveness in the long term.



As time passes, the impact on modules 10, and 11 became stronger, while
positive impact declined in module 8.



No clear impact was found in modules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12.
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Table 24 Findings by the ISM module in short term
Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

3/1.9

16/10.3

12/7.8

25/16.1

0/0

80/51.6

ISM

0/0

7/5.2

0/0

10/7.5 21/15.8

20/15.0

9/6.8

10/7.5

48/36.1

Diff.(%)

0

+5.2

0

+7.2

-9.3

+7.5

-15.5

+5.6

+5.5

11

12

Total

19/12.3 0/0

155/100

3/2.3 5/3.8
-10

133/100

+3.8

-

(Unit: pcs / %)

Table 25 Findings by the ISM module in long term
Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

2/2.2

5/5.4

6/6.5

3/3.3

0/0

64/69.6

12/13.0

0/0

92/100

ISM

0/0

4/5.4

0/0

7/9.5

12/16.2

16/21.6

6/8.1

6/8.1

22/29.7

0/0

1/1.4

74/100

Diff.(%)

0

+5.4

0

+7.3

+10.8

+15.1

+4.8

+8.1

-39.9

-13.0

+1.4

-

(Unit: pcs / %)

Based on the analysis, it could be said that PSC inspection has an impact on
emergency preparedness (module 8), maintenance (module 10), and documentation
(module 11) which is opposite to the results of 6.1.4. In the ISM-first group, the ISM
audit did not impact modules 8, 10, or 11; on the other hand, the PSC-first group
showed the impact only in those modules where the ISM-first group did not have
effects. This might be a typical relationship between PSC inspection and the ISM
audit. Among modules positively impacted, PSC primarily impacts on the
maintenance issue, which is being strengthened as time goes by. It was possible to
see that the improvement in the maintenance issue contributes to the overall
reduction in the number of findings. But this outcome might be due to different
purposes and practices of both regimes.

It was also found that there was not clear impact on the following ISM audit in
various modules other than modules 8, 10, and 11. There were no deficiencies
relating to the modules 2, 3, 4, 9 or 12, and the deficiencies relating to module 5,
remained at around 2% of deficiencies. Considering that the ISM audit influenced
the PSC inspection in various modules, and it became wider as time passed, the
PSC inspection has shown considerably different outcomes. Irrespective of the
variations in the number of findings, this analysis strongly suggests that the PSC
regime has little impact on the overall safety management system.
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To validate the above analysis, the bad performers’ data was analyzed again.
Table 26 and 27 explain the comparisons of the findings of the bad performers in
two timeframes.



Positive impact was witnessed in modules 8, 10, and 11 in the short term.



Most of the modules were similar or became worse, particularly modules 7,
and 9.
Table 26 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in short term

Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

3/2.2

15/10.9

9/6.6

22/16.1

0/0

71/51.8

17/12.4

0/0

137/100

ISM

0/0

3/4.5

0/0

7/10.6

10/15.2

12/18.2

3/4.6

5/7.6

22/33.3

2/3.0

2/3.0

66/100

Diff.(%)

0

+4.5

0

+8.4

+4.3

+11.6

-11.5

+7.6

-18.5

-9.4

+3.0

-

(Unit: pcs / %)

The bad performers in the short term showed precisely similar tendencies with the
overall condition illustrated in Tables 24, and 25. Only three modules had some
impact. But some inputs in modules 6, and 7 exist although there was no clear
impact on the following ISM audit.



Modules 10, and 11 showed positive impacts in the long term.



No impact was found other than modules 10, and 11.



The strong impacts were found in module 10.
Table 27 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in long term

Module

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Total

PSC

0/0

0/0

0/0

1/1.3

4/5.3

5/6.6

2/2.6

0/0

55/72.4

9/11.8

0/0

76/100

ISM

0/0

2/6.1

0/0

6/18.2

5/15.2

9/27.3

2/6.0

2/6.0

7/21.2

0/0

0/0

33/100

Diff.(%)

0

+6.1

0

+16.9

+9.9

+20.7

+3.4

+6.0

-51.2

-11.8

0

-

(Unit: pcs / %)
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It was confirmed again in the bad performers that there were only positive effects
on modules 8, 10, and 11 in the short term and module 8 lost impact in the long term.
The large decrease in the number of NCs in module 10 (maintenance) led to
improvement in the long term; however, it is unclear whether this is due to limited
data sampling. Based on the above figure, it becomes more obvious that PSC does
not have much impact on various aspects of the safety management system, but it
does have an influence on maintenance and documentation related issues.
Consequently, it is possible to arrive at the logical conclusion that the performance
of the PSC-first group and its performance variations were not strongly related to the
outcome of the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code.
6.2.5 Discussions

Table 28 compares the performance of the PSC-first group in the two time frames.
This table tells us that the good performers in the PSC inspection maintain a similar
condition regardless of the timeframe, which is an entirely different result from the
ISM-first group. Meanwhile, the bad performers make more improvement in the long
term than in the short term period.
Table 28 Performances comparisons by the time passage
Performance

Good performers

Bad performers

Time frame

0~180D

181~365D

0~180D

181~365D

Maintained or Improved

62.1%

65.0%

38.1%

58.3%

Similar or worsen

37.9%

35.0%

61.9%

41.7%

In the short term period, the good performers and bad performers commonly
sustained similar condition of around 62%, which is the same pattern shown in the
ISM-first group. As concluded in 6.1.5, from this similar trend, it can be understood
that the SMS, particularly the improvement mechanism is not working properly.
However, more attention needs to be paid to the bad performers’ improvement
(38.1%) which is higher than the ISM-first group (25.0%).
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While the NCs in the ISM-first group were mostly associated with findings that
require a long time to correct, the deficiencies of the PSC-fist group, which
constitute improvement in the short term, are connected with modules 8, 10, and 11,
wherein remedial action can be made quickly. The reasonable interpretation is that
intensified inspection regarding modules 8, 10, and 11 resulted in fewer NCs in
those areas in the following ISM audit. It is not quite certain that the improvement
mechanism worked on only those deficiencies, bearing in mind that most of the
other modules did not give clear impact on the following audit. However, regardless
of whether those improvements were made through the improvement system or not,
it carries the strong implication that ships could benefit more immediately from PSC
inspection than ISM audit in the specific areas mentioned above.

As a reason for immediate effect, the monetary burden should be highlighted.
Considering that poor maintenance initiates most of PSC detentions, the ship
owners tend to cope actively with the maintenance issue, which showed the biggest
improvement in the PSC-first group as shown in Table 26. Once a ship is detained
in a foreign port, costs will occur not only for the repair but also for market delays.
The monetary burden and fear for detention could motivate ship owners to react
more sensitively to the PSC than to the ISM audit. Therefore, it could be inferred
that the bad performers’ improvement in the short term period seems to be a
consequence of the police power of PSC, which ultimately affects the safety
management system of the ship.

In the long term period, the performance of the good performers maintained a fair
level, while 58.3% of the bad performers maintained a same condition or made
improvements. It is a somewhat unexpected outcome that the good performers
maintained or enhanced their performance in spite of time passage. As discussed in
6.1.5, the degradation of performance as time lapses after the external stimulus is
quite normal in reality. Besides, the data gives no clear statistical clues to interpret it.
The similarity analysis was also not sufficient to provide the cause of the
improvement as it simply captured an overall view.
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However, relating to why the PSC-first group does not show degradation of
performance as time passes, attention should be paid to Table 25 wherein the group
made much improvement in module 10, where the majority of deficiencies were
found, in the long term than short term period. This gives some idea when we
recollect the explanations of the degradations as time passes, which were discussed
in 6.1.5. The seafarers might keep their level of attention on the maintenance issue
after the bad memory of PSC inspection. It should be noted that the ship would not
be able to exactly anticipate the next PSC inspection; however, ship owners can
somewhat assume the time window for inspection through the targeting system.
Today, the regional MoUs have global coverage, and their member States share
inspection records to achieve common goals in their region. This global cooperative
regime makes the ship ready for inspection in daily operations, unlike periodical
verification.

The bad performers in the long term period made notable improvement. But if
looking inside, as discussed in 6.2.4, PSC does not have much impact on overall
modules other than modules 10, and 11 where the improvement is mostly
concentrated. It does not mean that the PSC had ‘zero’ impact on the following ISM
audit since the deficiencies related to modules 5, 6, and 7 were influential to some
extent as seen in Tables 24, 25, 26, and 27. But from the statistical point of view, it
might be a correct expression that PSC does not impact to the safety management
system in the bad performer group.

Some might say the improvements in modules 10, and 11 were due to the fact that
PSC always records more deficiencies in module 10 than the ISM audit. This is the
right point of view because, while auditors tend to look into the crew’s activities with
a systematic approach, PSCO begins its inspection with the certificates and
documents and then by checking the overall maintenance condition of the ship. The
argument that PSC only impacts maintenance and emergency drill or documentation
and certifications, seems reasonable. However, we need to reconsider the functions
of the ISM Code.
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In theory, regardless of the number of deficiencies, if one ship has some
deficiencies, the improvement mechanism should have been activated to avoid
similar problems in the future. Therefore, it is premature to say that the PSC
inspection does not impact the ISM audit considering the improvement mechanism
of the ISM Code. Nonetheless the fact that the PSC did not identify deficiencies in
modules 2, 3, 4, 9, or 12 as seen Tables 24, and 25 could be an innate limitation of
the PSC regime to act as a robust safety net in the shipping industry. Therefore,
even though bad performers in the PSC-first group showed better performance than
the ISM-first group and fewer strong similarities were presented, the ISM Code
might not be working as hypothesized. This might be a reason that its ostensible
performance was not obtained through the improvement mechanism. However, we
should highlight the power of the police function of the PSC in the maintenance
issue.

Taking into account the innate characteristics of both regimes and how the
improvement mechanism should work, it can be clarified that current PSC
inspections give some input to the safety management system, but the shipboard
activity does not make use of it productively. It seems that the deficiencies in the
PSC inspection have not been processed according to the SMS and it has not been
monitored properly either. In this point, there must be a cause and effect relationship
with the fact that there was only one deficiency in module 9 in the datasets used. So
it comes to the supposition that if the PSCO pays more attention to how the
deficiencies in the PSC are processed using the improvement mechanism of the
ISM Code, it might be possible to see more improvements triggered by PSC
deficiencies instead of being left as just records of the inspections.

6.2.6 Summary of analysis of the PSC-first group

Key findings from analysis in 6.2 are as follows;

In the short term


Good performers in the PSC showed good performance.



Bad performers showed more improvement compared to the ISM-first group.
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In the long term


Good performers in the PSC improved their performances.



Bad performers primarily made improvement in maintenance.

To recap, the analysis revealed that the PSC inspection has a positive impact on
the following ISM audit to some extent in the short term, which is mainly due to the
fear of detention and monetary burdens owing to the PSC inspection. Dissimilar to
the ISM-first group, the good performers maintained a similar level or better
regardless of time passage, which might mean that the unscheduled inspection and
targeting system, contrary to the periodical survey, gives stronger and more
powerful warnings to the shipping industry.

Furthermore, it is noted that the positive impact of PSC inspection mostly focused
on the maintenance issue in the long term, while there were not many impacts on
the overall safety management system of the ship. Even though few deficiencies
related to procedural findings were identified in the PSC inspection due to the innate
trait of the regime, deficiency should have been taken as NCs according to the
improvement mechanism of the ISM Code. In connection with the hypothesis, the
PSC-first group showed performances corresponding to the hypothesis, but it did
not show progress by the nature of the findings. This might be because the
reduction in the findings did not come from the improvement mechanism.

In this respect, it might be inferred that the improvement mechanism of the SMS
does not function in response to deficiencies as appropriate, which makes the PSC
inspection ineffective on the following ISM audit. It was suggested that PSCO should
pay more attention to how the deficiencies are processed through the SMS
procedures to prevent recurrence. Consequently, the PSC has little impact on the
overall safety management system but has a much stronger impact on the limited
area due to the police function of the PSC.
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7. CONCLUSION

The objectives of this dissertation were to examine how the ISM Code impacts the
PSC inspection, and how the PSC inspection influences the implementation of the
ISM Code. To achieve these aims, the dissertation focused on the improvement
mechanism of the ISM Code which should be activated if a ship has any deviation or
defects during the implementation of the SMS. The continuous improvement
indicates compliance with the ISM Code, and it would be a strong signal that the
safety culture has been internalized in the company so that crews actively take part
in the safety management system (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005; Lappalainen &
Salmi, 2009).

Based on the concept of the improvement mechanism, the hypothesis was
established. If the bad performers in ISM audit or PSC inspection show good
performance in the following PSC inspection or ISM audit, with partial or no similarity,
we could infer that the ISM Code is working properly. Conversely, if the bad
performers exhibit similar results with strong similarity by the nature of the findings,
the ISM Code might be working ineffectively because it would be the consequence
of a malfunction of the improvement mechanism.

This paper used both ISM audit and PSC inspection records of Korean ships from
the second half of 2013 to 2015, and compiled through tracking the history of
individual ship records to observe the impact of the previous event on the
successive event. In addition, the datasets were divided by time intervals (0~180
days and 181~365 days) between the two events to analyze the variations by
passage of time, and only ships with no event during those intervals were used in
the analysis to see immediate influences.
72

According to the analysis, it was found that, regardless of performance level, ISM
audit did not noticeably impact the following PSC inspection and the performance
level remained in a similar condition in the short term. This can occur when the SMS
is in a static condition without any changes regardless of good or wrong directions.
So it was concluded that the ISM-first group in the short term had no improvement,
which might be due to insufficient time to address the NCs because the NCs were
mostly concentrated in areas which require a systematic approach, safety culture
and time to complete corrective actions. Nevertheless, this indicates that the
improvement mechanism of the ISM Code does not have an effect on the safety
system in this specific timeframe.

Meanwhile, in the long term period, dissimilar to short term results, a very strong
positive impact of the ISM audit was witnessed in the bad performers on the
following PSC inspection in all aspects of safety management. Simultaneously,
some declining performance in the good performers was noticed. It was interpreted
that the effect of the ISM Code was revealed in the long term since it requires a
particular timeframe for the NCs to be reflected in the SMS and internalized into the
procedures of real shipboard operations. In the meantime, degradation of the good
performers represents the significance of the shore-based management and
continuous monitoring by PSC. It was found in the ISM-first group that the
improvement mechanism needs some time to function, and an action to keep the
good performer in compliance is required.

In the PSC-first group, the bad performers in the short term period showed more
improvement than the ISM-first group. But the improvement was mostly
concentrated in limited areas, such as emergency preparedness, maintenance, and
documentation, wherein the ISM-first group showed bad performance, while there
were no improvements in other areas of the safety management system. This paper
pointed out that the reason for the improvement was that the police power of the
PSC motivated the ship owner to respond sensitively to the maintenance issues,
which are the major deficiencies, to avoid detention and subsequent monetary
burden.
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In the long term of the PSC-first group, the bad performers exhibited considerable
improvements, while the good performers showed enhanced performance without
degradation over the time. In determining data, it was found that there were similar
tendencies in the short term of PSC-first group whereby only limited areas of the
SMS were affected. This outcome strengthened the explanation as to the effect of
the police power of the PSC. Besides, relating to the good performers, it was
discussed that maintaining a certain level of performance reflected the unexpected
inspection characteristic of PSC, including the targeting system, which provides
strong warnings to a shipping company to maintain its ships in fair condition at all
times. In this regard, it is possible to conclude that the PSC has an impact on the
following ISM audit directly through its police power.

Consequently, in a point of effectiveness of the ISM Code, the analysis of the ISMfirst group presented corresponding outcomes to the hypothesis. It denoted that the
ISM Code has been working although a particular time is required to show the effect
of the improvement mechanism. Whereas the ISM Code is working partly in PSCfirst group, it would be a more reasonable conclusion that the variations in
performance are mainly attributed to the police function of the PSC. This is why the
PSC-first group did not show progress in overall safety management system
although it corresponded to the hypothesis.

From the ISM Code and PSC perspective, the ISM Code showed strong features in
the long term period. It represented apparent improvement effects on the areas
where the ship had NCs, which could result in the substantial improvement of the
safety management system. But it would not be easy to expect the immediate
improvement because certain time to manifest the effect of the improvement
mechanism is required. On the other hand, PSC inspection indicates clear and
powerful impact on some part of SMS. The police power of PSC had immediate
impacts in the short term, which continued over time. On the other hand, it is difficult
to expect the continuous improvement of safety management systems if it relies
solely on the police power of PSC.
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On the basis of the above, it is possible to conclude that there is a mutual
complementary relationship between the ISM audit and PSC inspection. So if both
regimes might be able to complement their weaknesses and utilize each other’s
merits, the effectiveness of the ISM Code and PSC will be evidently increased. As
illustrated in Figure 4, PSC inspection has strong features in the short period in
ensuring the maintenance condition of the vessel, documentation, such as
certificates, and nautical charts through its police power, while it has shown some
vulnerability in addressing continuous improvement. In contrast, ISM audit brings
continuous improvement in the long term because the ISM audit has an effective
impact on the overall safety management system by means of the improvement
mechanism, which will cultivate a safety culture. The police power of the PSC,
therefore, can supplement the weakness of the ISM Code in the short term, and at
the same time, the continuous improvement under the systematic approach of the
ISM Code can make the PSC inspection more powerful.

Figure 4 Strength and weakness of PSC inspection and ISM audit

On this point, it is worth undertaking further study seeking a way to create synergy
by utilizing the strengths of both regimes. Moreover, although this paper has limited
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representativeness of the data, a further study could expand the dataset and applies
the methodology of this paper and incorporating further variables of the ship, such
as type, age, and marine accident records. In addition, a qualitative survey might
provide with more accurate and meaningful outcomes. Furthermore, it seemingly
necessary in conducting the PSC inspection that PSCO focuses more on the
continuous improvement function of the ISM Code, such as how the Master’s review,
incident report and company’s verification, and previous PSC deficiencies were
processed according to the SMS. Likewise, from the ISM auditors’ point, more
attention should be paid to whether permanent corrective actions were appropriately
taken concerning PSC deficiencies.
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